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Investigating Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological status in each of his 
dialogues, this book is going to challenge the current theories of Plato’s development 
and suggest a new theory.  
Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars 
have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While 
developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental 
differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert 
that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of the first two chapters is 
to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles 
change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and middle period 
dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach 
corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact 
that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his 
epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and 
epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the 
bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the 
tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates 
the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before 
the dialogues of the middle period. 
The first chapter entitled “Plato’s Onto-Epistemological Principles in the Early 
Dialogues” tries to draw out six principles out of Plato’s early dialogues specially 
Euthyphro, Laches, Charmides, Hippias Major and Euthydemus. We discuss that 
these principles present kind of a bipolar as well as split ontology and epistemology. 
The second chapter, “Revision of First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period 
Dialogues”, aims to argue that the onto-epistemological principles of the early 
dialogues are being radically changed in three dialogues of Meno, Phaedo and 
Republic in the middle period dialogues. Not only the bipolar ontology and 
epistemology of the early dialogues give place to a tripartite ontology and 
epistemology but also their split being and knowledge are inclined to be replaced by 
bound being and knowledge.  
Our next step in this book is to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of 
being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a 
copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest 
a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai 
both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of 
Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato says that something both is and is 
not, he is applying difference on being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing 
Aristotle’s terminology, 'is is (esti) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show 
how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s ontology in 
Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in general. Thence, 
chapter three, “Pollachos Esti; Plato’s Ontology in Sophist and Republic”, intends to 
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discuss that i) the theories of ‘being as difference’ and ‘being of a copy’, considered 
together in what we call the theory of pollachos esti, can well be compared to the 
structure of pollachos legetai in Aristotle when it is attached to the theories of pros 
hen and substance; and ii) the ontology of Republic V-VII is based on this theory and 
is, thus, almost the same as the ontology of Sophist.    
Investigating the most famous chronologies of the last 150 years from 
Campbell on, the fourth chapter, “The Standard Chronology of the Dialogues”, is to 
argue that all of them have a somewhat fix and dogmatic arrangement of Plato’s 
dialogues in which Meno, Phaedo and Republic are located after some early 
dialogues and before Theaetetus and Parmenides, on the one hand, and all the so-
called late period dialogues after Theaetetus and Parmenides on the other hand. It is 
also reminded that all that the stylometric evidences can show is the lateness and 
homogeneity of the late period dialogues and, thence, nothing about the relation 
between dialogues like Theaetetus, Parmenides and Republic.  
The standard chronology is the subject of many criticisms some of which are 
discussed in our fifth chapter, “Objections against the Standard Chronology”, in three 
groups. While the first group of objections criticizes the place of the middle period 
dialogues immediately after the early ones, the second group attacks the place of late 
dialogues after the middle ones. The third group includes objections against the place 
of Parmenides in the standard chronology and tries to show that it cannot be 
considered after the middle period dialogues. 
The efforts of the first five chapters lead to a new theory of Plato’s ontological 
as well as epistemological development in an onto-epistemological chronology of his 
dialogues in our sixth chapter, “An Onto-Epistemological Chronology of Plato’s 
dialogues”. Instead of three periods, this chronology includes four waves of 
dialogues, Socratic wave, ontological wave, epistemological wave and political 
wave, in which all the so-called middle and late period dialogues are to be interpreted 
based on the problems presented in Parmenides I. The main changes we suggest in 
the standard chronology include firstly that Theaetetus and Parmenides I must be 
posited before Meno and Phaedo and, secondly, Republic must be posited after 
Sophist. Based on this arrangement, we can find Philosophos, Plato’s promised but 








The Onto-Epistemological Principles of the Early Dialogues 
 
 
The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues 
have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, 
Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007)
1
 think that from 
the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some 
essential points, the unitarists 
2
 like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there 




In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten 
theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes 
Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, 
Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 
'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. 
These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of 
the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with 
Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, 
Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his 
list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply 
with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with 
Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses4 is 
                                                 
1  See also: Prior (1985, 10-37) 
2 Gerson (2002, 85) distinguishes between three groups of antidevelopmentalists which 
include unitarists, those who take the dialogues protreptic and agnosticistic. 
3  Being a unitarist, Cormack (2006, 15) thinks that the early dialogues are "protreptic". He 
(ibid, 9-10) points to the fact that the "historical interpretation" which tries to refer the 
distinction of the early and middle dialogues to the distinction between Socrates and Plato 
and the developmental interpretations are not mutually exclusive. By calling Plato’s thought 
'the unity of growth and development', Allen (1970, 157), it seems, tries to reconcile the 
developmentalist with unitarist approach. 
4
 The ten theses point orderly to these differences: 1) a moral philosopher vs. a metaphysician; 
2) separated Forms and Soul in the latter; 3) elenctical vs. demonstrative philosophy; 4) 
complex and tripartite model of the soul in second Socrates; 5) second Socrates' mastership 
in mathematics; 6) being populist vs. elitist; 7) second Socrates’ elaborate political theory; 8) 
second Socrates' metaphysical grounding in love for the transcendent Form of beauty; 9) 
practical and ethical vs.  mystical and contemplated religion and 10) adversative vs. didactic 
philosophy (1991, 47-49). Robinson (1953, 61) points to their difference in respect of 
method and methodology.  
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considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues.
1
 
Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be 
supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as 
epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. 
Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles 
Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle 
dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including 
Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the 
other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold 
dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its 
climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. 
Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle 
dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 
'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the 
reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and 
epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical 
advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of 
education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with 
the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones
2
 (ibid, 66). The seven threshold 
dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and 
readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues
3
 (ibid, 59-60). 
To show that the differences of the two Socrateses
4
 of the early and middle 
period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be 
                                                 
1 Fine agrees with Vlastos that there are some 'genuine' differences, but she does not agree 
with such a wide difference: 'Plato is more of a Socratic than Vlastos allows' (1993, 83). She 
thinks that Vlastos 'overemphasizes' on differences (ibid, 68). 
2 Allen, on the contrary, thinks that the difference between theories in the early and middle 
period dialogues is not between what is tentative and what is thought and came to a 
conclusion (1959, 174). 
3 E.g., Kahn (1996, 339) thinks that the trio of Laches, Euthyphro and Meno 'is best read 
together as a well-planned essay on definition'. Therefore, the search of essence in dialogues 
is 'future-oriented' form the start. While there is some truth in Mackay’s view that we should 
substitute the pedagogical or mental growth with a dramatic and dialectical development, 'an 
elaboration of many themes within a single theme; the clarification of an original insight 
through opposition and new perspective' (1928, 14), I do not think it is enough for being a 
unitarist in Plato (ibid, 11). Even a developmentalsit might share this view. 
4 None of these Socrateses I take as historical Socrates. The first Socrates of this paper means 
only the Socrates of the early period dialogues specially that of Laches, Hippias Major, 
Euthyphro, Euthydemus and Charmides while the second Socrates is that of Meno, Phaedo 
and Republic. Contrary to Vlastos who takes the Socrates of the early dialogues as the 
historical Socrates (1991, 77), an idea in which many scholars like Silverman (2002,28) 
share with him, I think while we can be sure that the first Socrates is closer to the historical 
Socrates, there might arise many problems if we ascribe either the dramatic character or the 
suggested theories in the early dialogues to the historical Socrates. Therefore, my position is 
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explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological 
principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second 
part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. 
Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being 
knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge,
1
 they deny it and even never 
discuss it directly.
2
 Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge 
throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of 
knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a 
circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this 
circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, 
its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an 
intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of 
having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe 
because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always 
paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 
505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows 
something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This 
examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. 
Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ 
ἐστιν) question, 3 a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned 
with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is 
temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we 
call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates 
used to employ,
 4
 is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He 
                                                                                                                                          
like that of Benson (2000, 7) that it is best not to assume the theories as merely belonging to 
the historical Socrates or the writer of dialogues himself.  
1  Kirkland notes that Socrates wants to bring about some kind of 'non-epistemic but 
nonetheless true and properly human way' of his question, thus, does not aim 'moral 
knowledge' (2012, 8), goes far from the overall epistemic spirit of the early dialogues.   
2 Vlastos (1957, 229) thinks that it is not accidental since heretofore the investigation of 
knowledge is 'a dependency of ontological or cosmological inquiry'. As Vlastos correctly 
points out, Charmides 165c is where Socrates comes so close to this investigation though 
still avoids it. About his reference to Euthydemus 282e, I cannot see any evidence.  
Euthdemus 288d-e is not as close as the mentioned passage of Charmides. The same can be 
said about 292d. 
3
 Cf. Euthyphro 6e3-4, Hippias Major 286d1-2, Laches 190a4, 191d9  
4  It is generally assumed that this question was the very question historical Socrates used to 
employ which has also Aristotle (1078b27-30) as its evidence. Nonetheless, we are not to 
claim this by so calling the question. The doubt Weiss (2009) brings forth about the role of 
the Socratic question based on the absence of the question in Apology seems unnecessary 
either we take it about historical Socrates or Plato’s Socrates.Though hinting to the process 
of elenchus (21-22), Apology is not to set a Socratic investigation and does not thus need to 
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disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and 
he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor 
can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, 
he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X.  Knowing the answer 
to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he 
cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the 
point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he 
becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not 
know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing 
what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. 
Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages.
1
 At 
Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: 
 
I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα 
ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν)2 
 
Moreover, at 21d4-6: 
 
None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not 
know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. 
 
 In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of 
thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The 
somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his 
disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): 
 
I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, 
like now, who can say anything else without being absurd.  
 
 At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of 
knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine:  
 
I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). 
Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about 
Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence1: 'that to do 
                                                                                                                                          
use the Socratic question. This can be the reason why it does not mention it. We may 
reasonably assume that the elenchus he speaks there about must have the question in use. 
1 E.g., Laches 186 d8-e2, 200e3-4 (εἰδώς, … μὴ εἰδότε) Hippias Major 286c-e, 304d7-8, 
Apology 21b 4-5, d4-6, 29b1-7, Gorgias 505e6-506a4, 509a4-7, Charmides 165b4-c2, 
166d1-2, Euthyphro 5a1-2, Meno 71a6-7 (οὐδὲ αὐτὸ ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ παράπαν ἀρετὴ 
τυγχάνω εἰδώς), 71b3 (οὐκ εἰδὼς περὶ ἀρετῆς τὸ παράπαν), Symposium 216d2-4 
2 Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally committed 
to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed. 
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wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and 
shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to 
show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim 
is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to 
violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before 
the already mentioned passage: 
 
And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what 
one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that 
I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than 
anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge 
(οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of  things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ 
εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) 
  
Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of 
knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 
11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an 
elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks 
elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18).
2
 Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge 
and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, 
but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to 
recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if 
they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a 
point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show 
below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in 
Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and 
the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. 
Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction 
can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is 
unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary 
one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for 
someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is 
Gorgias 505e6-506a4: 
                                                                                                                                          
1
 He also mentions (1985, 7-10) some other texts like Republic 351a5-6, Protagoras 357d7-
e1, Crito 48a5-7 and Gorgias 479e8, 486e5-6, 512b1-2.  
2 Criticizing Vlastos’ distinction, Matthews (2006, 113) notes that Socrates neither does speak 
of two different senses of knowledge nor says 'I know and I don’t know'. The distinctions of 
expert and nonexpert or latent and manifest knowledge (cf., e.g., Woodruff (1995) , Taylor 
(2008) and Matthews (2008)) does not essentially differ from that of Vlastos. The trouble 
with all such suggestions is that, as Richard Bett points out, Plato 'gives no indication of 
wishing to multiply senses of the various words translated by "know"'(2011, 226). Pointing 
to tekhnê as a kind of knowledge, he suggests the distinction of the subject matters instead of 




I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you 
do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute 
me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ 
λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). 
 
 The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an 
argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what 
Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not 
the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be 
accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge 
is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question 
and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first 
Socrates.  
Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our 
second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That 
whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early 
dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself 
(1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the 
other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in 
there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own 
convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take 
elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and 
Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. 
Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a 
thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments 
under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they 
think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic 
elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and 
a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever 
differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological 
principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This 
method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. 
That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos 
(1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not
1
 is another issue to 
which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is 
that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is 
strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it 
should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He 
does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge.  
                                                 
1
 Gonzalez, for instance, thinks that in most of the early dialogues, protreptic is the only 
positive function of elenchus (2002a, 161-182). 
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He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that 
how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the 
highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no 
knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge 
is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that 
disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. 
The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and 
how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third 
element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by 
Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He 
insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are 
beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is 
waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are 
pious; and at 6d11-e1: 
 
Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions 
pious. 
 
  Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of 
knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between 
the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: 
 
I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι 
ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) 
to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it.  (Euthp. 11a6-9) 
1. Knowledge of what X is  
Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles
1
 of Socratic circle 
and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to 
present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology
2
 
when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some 
                                                 
1 Using the word "principle" for what I am going to discuss the ontology and epistemology of 
Socrates in both his early dialogues and his middle ones might be misleading. It is not to 
mean more than "ground" or "approach" and thus is not to be emphasized. 
2 This does not give us, however, the permission to agree with Woodruff (1978, 101-102) that 
Plato’s early dialogues are 'innocent of metaphysics' or 'ontologically neutral' or with Vlastos 
(1991, 15) that "no epistemological theory at all can be ascribed to Socrates". Trying to 
refute such views, Benson (2000, 3, n. 1) provides a list of those who think that the historical 
Socrates or Socrates of the earlier dialogues is no epistemologist. The reason for the fact that 
Socrates must have had some kind of metaphysics is best suggested by Silverman (2002, 28-
30). Despite the fact that Socrates is not interested in articulating a metaphysical theory, he 
thinks that Plato’s middle period metaphysics cannot have been emerged ex nihilo and must 
be considered as his reaction to the difficulties of the metaphysics of Socrates.    
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obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first 
systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with 
elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles 
cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very 
slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that 
is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all 
those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): 
 
KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. 
 
Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι 
question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ 
search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a 
search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now.
1
 
I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question
2
 nor to challenge taking 
it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer 
of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It 
entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about 
X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and 
Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can 
authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. 
The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer 
the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method 
and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end 
aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us 
from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of 
negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his 
interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 
'what is X?' question. 
  
                                                 
1 Fine, for example, asserts 'To know what F is is to know the answer to the question "what is 
F?", that is, to know the real definition of the nature of F-ness' (2003, 2) which she calls 'the 
principle of the priority of knowledge of a defintion'
1
(ibid). Iindicating specifically to Laches 
190b-c, calls it 'the epistemological priority of definitional knowledge'  (ibid, 25). Kahn 
articulates this priority of definition as such:'If you do not know at all what X is, you cannot 
know anything about X' (1996, 180-181). 
2 Think that the answer of the Socratic question is definition, some scholars insist on its being 
a real definition, contrasting, for instance, with nominal definition (cf. Wolfsdorf, 2005, 24), 
while some others regard the meaning of the concept as the answer. Wolfsdorf (ibid, 21) 
thinks that when Socrates, for example in Protagoras and Hippias Major, asserts that X must 
be something (τί), it means that he seeks a real definition and its identity and not its meaning. 
Vlastos (1973) believes the question to be constitutive and not semantic and thus does not 
agree with meaning as the aim of search. 
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2. & 3. Bipolar Epistemology and Ontology  
Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological 
principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): 
  
BE  There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. 
 
 BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective 
statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but 
that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This 
means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of 
interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that 
he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates 
never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let 
anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is.
1
  
The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another 
principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is 
as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This 
principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): 
  
BO Being is and not being is not. 
  
BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being 
and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the 
possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: 
 
The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ 
ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) 
 
He continues (b4-5): 
 
There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα 
ἐστίν).  
 
That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and 
ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not 
being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate 
                                                 
1 Euthdemus 293c–294a can be considered as a problem related to KWX and BE principles. 
Socrates states that if you are knowing, then you know (οὐκοῦν ἐπιστήμων εἶ, εἴπερ 
ἐπίστασαι) (293c2-3) and concludes that you must necessarily know all things if you are 
knowing (οὐκ ἀνάγκη σε ἔχει πάντα ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμονά γε ὄντα) (c4). The 
impossibility of being and not being the same (d4) is Socrates’ reason to conclude: 'If I know 
one thing, I know all (εἴπερ ἓν ἐπίσταμαι, ἅπαντα ἐπίσταμαι) since I could not be 
knowing and not knowing (ἐπιστήμων τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμων) at the same time' (d5-6). 
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discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive 
discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO 
for the first group of dialogues authentive. 
4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being  
The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): 
 
SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) 
as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. 
 
This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with 




But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you 
have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ 
ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) 
 
Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone 
rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be 
taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) 
the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its 
only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ 
εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this 
dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb 
ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these 
ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism 
has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What 
ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in 
mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing 
Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues.   
At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described 
as such: 
 
You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν 
ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν 
τοῖς λόγοις). 
  
                                                 
1 Thinking that Hippias Major does not commit Plato to the ontology of the middle period, 
Woodruff believes that from Hippias Major to the middle period dialogues there is some 
kind of proceeding from 'ontological neutrality toward a transcendental ontology' (1988, 
212). As it will be discussed below, while we agree with the first point, the ontological 
neutrality in not tenable. 
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This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, 
SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): 
 
SB  Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the 
whole being is split to many beings. 
 
Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are 
accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation 
is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic 
dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things 
which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand 
them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, 
for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it 
and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is 
directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to 
find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, 
every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every 
answer to every question aims at unity' (84).  
The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and 
SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic 
dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing 
what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely 
interdependent. 
What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic 
dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς 
οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is 
being said
1
 or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with 
changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. 
Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an 
epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first 
Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as 
Socratic prineple.  
6. Knowledge is of Being  
The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 
'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB):  
 
KB Knowledge is of Being. 
                                                 
1 Kerferd (1981, 47) argues pro the idea. Rankin (1983, 55) does not agree with him. It is not, 
however, included in the fragments of Dielz’ collection. I think that if it is to be accepted, 
Plato’s use of the theory as a critique of Socrates’ onto-epistemology can be used more 




This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very 
important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for 
the first time in Euthydemus.
1
 In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are 
encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge
2
, all grounded in 
the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies 
at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking 
about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) 
and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth 
when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things 
that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on 
Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus 
restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that 
are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do 
(πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything 
else can be done, which is impossible
3
 (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that 
exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). 
The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of 
false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the 
impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is 
asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of 
mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being 
simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. 
                                                 
1
 Most of the dialogues treating with this problem such as Theatetus and Sophist are observed 
as late dialogues in the 20
th
 century chronologies. The case of Gorgias is different. It 
mentions the issue without discussing it. While it accepts that there can be false conviction 
besides true conviction (πίστις ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθής) (454d5), false knowledge 
(ἐπιστήμη … ψευδὴς) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first simply by 
saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς.  
2
 The problems of:  learning both what you know and what you do not know (276d), 
possibility of telling lies (283e), impossibility of speaking things that are not (285e-286a, 
287a), impossibility of false speaking (286c), impossibilty of false thinking and opinion 
(286d) and the problem of knowing nothing or all things. (293c-294a)  
3 Ctesippus’ suggestion at 248c7-8 is surprisingly missed by Dionysodorus. He says that the 
problem could be solved if we accept that the one who tells lies speaks things that are in a 
way (τρόπον τινὰ) and not indeed as it is the case (ὥς γε ἔχει). This suggestion is close to 




Revision of First Socrates’ Principles in Middle Period Dialogues 
 
 
Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, 
Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first 
Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these 
principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. 
To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. 
The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a 
circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, 
Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle
1
 and the 
whole circle in disrupted in them.  
The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious.
2
 
The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he 
can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first 
appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of 
them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the 
historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his 
interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we 
have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. 
Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no 
positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive 
results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of 
what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so 
much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς 
δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of 
knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to 
knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a 
dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than 
anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they 
be repeated by asking the same questions. 
                                                 
1
 The only part in these dialogues that is constructed, like the early dialogues, based on 
Socratic circle is the first Book of the Republic. At 351a6, nonetheless, it is decisively said 
that 'no one can now be ignorant of this (οὐδεὶς ἂν ἔτι τοῦτο ἀγνοήσειεν) that injustice 
is ignorance'.  
2
 Vlastos explains this difference in his third pair of theses by distinguishing between elenctic 
versus demonstrative knowledge; while the first keeps disavowal claim, the second is 
confident that he can find knowledge. (1991, 76)  
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The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal1 is Meno 98b where he 
explicitly claims knowledge: 
 
And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing 
(εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are 
different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), 
but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- 
this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα).2 (98b1-5) 
  
This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There 
can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks 
about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone 
who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say 
in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly 
anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not 
know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know 
some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs 
his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here 
that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before 
which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable 
emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages 
where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has 
knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things.3  
From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has 
totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not 
speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable 
knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and 
achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to 
                                                 
1
 We have some other less important passages where it seems that he avows knowledge of 
some truths.  Phaedo 63c, though does not use the word 'knowing' is noteworthy. Socrates 
asserts that if he ever insists (διισχυρισαίμην) on anythings about the matters related to the 
after-death life, he insists on his going to his good masters, Gods, after death (63c2-4). 
2 καὶ μὴν καὶ ἐγὼ ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω, ἀλλὰ εἰκάζων: ὅτι δέ ἐστίν τι ἀλλοῖον ὀρθὴ 
δόξα καὶ ἐπιστήμη, οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκῶ τοῦτο εἰκάζειν, ἀλλ᾽ εἴπερ τι ἄλλο φαίην 
ἂν εἰδέναι—ὀλίγα δ᾽ ἂν φαίην—ἓν δ᾽ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκείνων θείην ἂν ὧν οἶδα. 
3
 The subject of Socrates’ avowal, i.e. the difference between knowledge and true opinion, can 
explain why Socrates’ most considerable claim of knowledge is asserted here. This 
distinction will be not only the basis of all his later onto-epistemology but also his theory of 
Forms. Timaeus (51d-e), for instance, regards this distinction as what can be a sufficient 
proof for the existence of Forms. 
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reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive
1
 
and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are 
purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly 
related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when 
Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because 
of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains 
unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. 
These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo 
and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched 
in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are 
suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still 
used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the 
dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be 
taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is 
dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death 
without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more 
complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: 
its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection 
of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. 
This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard 
it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far 
from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as 
their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and 
methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, 
I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to 
break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed 
is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds 
based on which new theories are suggested. 
1. Knowledge of the Good  
We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle 
loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still 
we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic 
question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ 
epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK 
directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. 
Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in 
                                                 
1 Vlastos speaks of the 'demise of the elenchus' before the middle period dialogues and in three 
dialogues of Euthydemus, Lysis and Hippias Major (1994, 29-33) because of the 
'abandonment of adversary argument as Socrates’ method of philosophical investigation' 
(p.30). He thinks that Socrates is both the author and the critic of the theories of these 
dialogues and they are, thus, uncontested by the interlocutors. 
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the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its 
complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not 
reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic 
principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): 
 
KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. 
 
Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about 
KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior 
principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of 
virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because 
nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). 
The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since 
virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good 
separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον 
ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good 
which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). 
What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is 
the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is 
alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much 
deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The 
effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of 
explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology 
of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is 
totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the 
sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the 
Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we 
know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7).  The problem of 
our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the 
same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of 
looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of 
the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the 
intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not 
sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. 
It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws 
our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in 
the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-
6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear 
vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge 
based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any 




The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what 
is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) 
and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) 
 
Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both 
aletheia and to on.
1
 He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the 
conclusion of the analogy: 
 
That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to 
the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge 
and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας)2 so far as it is known 
(ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) 
  
Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the 
same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly 
contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. 
As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can 
observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, 
corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates.  
The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of 
the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. 
Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. 
The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, 
something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the 
cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in 
visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible 
realm (517c). 
2. Tripartite Epistemology  
BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, 
the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): 
 
TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. 
  
                                                 
1 The relation of the Good on the one hand and being and truth on the other hand remains, I 
think, ambiguous at least in Republic. All that we hear from Plato here is that the Good is 
beyond them. I cannot understand what kind of evidence Cynthia Hampton had to conclude 
that truth in Republic is 'likewise a Form and a part of the Good' and also an 'ontological 
notion' (1998, 239). 
2 One might agree with Politis that by the things that are capable of being known, Plato has in 
mind, 'at least primarily', the other ideas (2010, 102). Cooper's translation (ed.) of ὡς 
γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ ('it is an object of knowledge') cannot be satisfactory.  
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BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and 
ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could 
not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, 
however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but 
rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would 
reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about 
knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not 
the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All 
we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an 
already demonstrated one. 
Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working 
of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not 
know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion:  
 
So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν 
ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ)1 has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same 
things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). 
 
The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. 
(also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their 
difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So 
are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one 
ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is 
anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as 
the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the 
one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to 
give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able 
to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). 
Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in 
Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and 
anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not 
able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, 
though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a 
distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul 
of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and 
                                                 
1 While some of the translators do not translate περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ (e. g., Cooper (ed.)) 




contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. 
Meno 98b2-5). 
The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference 
with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based 
on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we 
do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter 
at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction 
with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the 
distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: 
 
So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true 
opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν 
ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) 
 
This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the 
same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true 
opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι 
ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ 
οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has 
true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων 
and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he 
did not want to emphasize.  
3. Tripartite Ontology  
The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, 
has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 
'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): 
 
TO  There are things that both are and are not. 
 
This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to 
Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. 
Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates 
distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand 
the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can 
only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself 
and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he 
knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since 
those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ 




- Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing 
(οὐδέν)? 
- He knows something (τί). 
- Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? 
- Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ 
ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? 
- Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine 
it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς 
γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way 
unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον).  
- A most adequate one. 
- Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ 
εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς 
ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? 
- Yes, it’s intermediate. 
- Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance 
(ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an 
intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be 
set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? 
 
From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. 
The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the 
mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is 
something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be 
acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and 
non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many 
scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like 
predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of 
Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" 
cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a 
predicative or veridical sense of being.  
4. Bound Knowledges  
In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second 
Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): 
 
BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. 
 
We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had 
not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the 
second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates 
remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he 
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was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of 
everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest 
on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer 
from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. 
One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of 
everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 
97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he 
has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to 
show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to 
explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if 
it is based on the concept of the Good.  
That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved 
even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, 
nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In 
addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have 
τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα 
κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can 
clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully 
was its claim to provide the cause of  all things by one thing. Another reason was that 
Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything 
by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more 
to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory 
because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for 
Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of 
the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong 
willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of 
this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it 
as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is 
wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when 
Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him 
like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We 
see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in 
the second sentence after introducing Mind: 
 
I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put 
each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished 
to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to 
find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted 
upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about 
this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best 
(βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), 




This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his 
own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory 
after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for 
explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is 
better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3).1  
What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had 
been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with 
their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for 
everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the 
unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him.
2
 We must insist that 
we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should 
have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not 
about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On 
the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but 
Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how 
to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to 
show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be 
wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον 
                                                 
1 This is also clear from 98a1-b3:  
If he showed me those things I should be prepared never to desire any other 
kind of cause. I was ready to find out in the same way (οὕτω … ὡσαύτως) 
about the sun and the moon and …., how it is best (πῇ ποτε ταῦτ᾽ ἄμεινόν 
ἐστιν) that each should act or be acted upon. I never thought that Anaxagoras, 
who said that those things were directed by Mind, would bring any other cause 
for them than that it was best for them as they are (βέλτιστον αὐτὰ οὕτως 
ἔχειν ἐστὶν ὥσπερ ἔχει). Once he had given the best for each (ἑκάστῳ 
βέλτιστον) as the cause for each and the general cause of all, I thought he 
would go on to explain the common good for all (τὸ κοινὸν πᾶσιν 
ἐπεκδιηγήσεσθαι ἀγαθόν). 
2
 Politis, conversely, thinks it is not true to say Socrates introduced this new method of 
explanation because of the fact that they were not good-based. 'Socrates’ complaint against 
traditional explanation', he says, 'is independent of and prior to his becoming hopeful about 
good–based ones.' (2010, 99) If we have to accept that what he means by ‘good-based’ 
explanation is the same with what Socrates had in mind about Anaxagoras’ theory, Politis is 
misleading here. Socrates’ hope for Anaxagoras’ theory was, I believe, owing to the fact that 
he had been disappointed with natural philosophers’ explanations which justifies the 
suggestion to take that which is included in this new theory as the same with what was 
absent before.  It is also misleading, I think, to call Socrates' theory teleological if we mean 
by this some kind of explanation that must be considered besides other kinds of explanation 
as, for example, Taylor thinks. (1998, 11) If we behold the essential relation between the 
Good and the knowledge and observe the fact that the good is here considered as the basis of 




συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the 
name of BK principle: 
     
They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them 
together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν 
οἴονται). (99c5-6)  
 
Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at 
Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the 
truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about 
the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty 
which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is 
asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not 
only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but 
also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. 
At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth 
to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν 
ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν 
ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological 
structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of 
the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of 
knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the 
author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges 
of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its 
participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to 
the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we 
observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative 
relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars 
(e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 
988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his 
statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between 
the Good and unity may become more understandable.  
Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than 
discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is 
played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role 
is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its 
objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the 
sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 
509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The 
hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from 
imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all 
kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis 
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starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not 
directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other 
subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 
'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) 
(511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm 
but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological 
principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, 
thus, unified by. 
5. Bound Beings  
The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): 
 
BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. 
 
We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized 
because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The 
principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is 
done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that 
evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological 
scene: 
 
You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of 
being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) 
 
This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to 
being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role 
in the intelligible realm (b6-10): 
 
Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known 
(γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being 
(οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and 
power. 
  
That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition 
to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition 
to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can 
be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the 
intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is 
corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to 
observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from 
his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its 
source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can 
conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the 
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intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) 
because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light.1  
 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge  
Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO 
principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB  in the same 
way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology 
necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 
'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): 
 
PBK To every class
2
 of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. 
 
This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not 
kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we 
can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the 
concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were 
for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. 
Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is 
drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is 
articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of 
Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them 
belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things 
(more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο 
ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding  to the Forms and 
the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares 
in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its 
object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) 
 
*** 
From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles 
turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and 
ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle 
period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of 
the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound 
beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of 
principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly 
                                                 
1
 Socrates’ statement at 517c1-2 that the form of the Good 'is the cause of all that is right and 
beautiful in everything (πᾶσι πάντων) is also noticeable. 
2
 I do not insist on the word here. I used 'class' to avoid the possible interpretations which 
words like 'level' and 'degree' might arise. 
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formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the 
distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying 
to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in 
middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the 
favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were 
to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the 












































The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about 
two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether 
what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being.
1
 The 
second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion 
which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial 
point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and 
ignorance (α ͗γνοιας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads 
Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects.
2
 
The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that 
when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is 
not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing 
can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution 
seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish 
fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not 
attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the 
most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" 
but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being 
in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars 
to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian 
distinctions between different senses of being.
3
 In the predicative reading, Annas, for 
                                                 
1
One may say, like Bolton, that Plato’s paradoxical phrase must be taken literally. 'All that 
Plato means to claim in Republic V', he says, 'is that beautiful sensible objects are not 
unqualifiedly beautiful' (1998, 124). 
2
 As Annas notes, this disjunction of the objects of knowledge and opinion, is the most 
controversial among Platonic theories because it puts the philosopher in a 'different 
cognitive world' (1981, 193). 
3
 Plato’s elaborate discussion of being in Sophist, besides Republic, provided the required 
ground for many (e.g., Gosling, 1973, 214; Brown, 1986, 68-69; Ackrill, 1957, 1-6; 
Bostock, 1984, 89-119; Owen 1971, 223-67; Runciman, 1962, 89-90; Cornford, 1935, 
296; Grombie, 1963, 499) to find some evidences of some kind of distinction either 
between complete and incomplete senses of the verb or the 'is' of identity and the 'is' of 
predication or … Challenging the distinction of the identity from predicative use of the 
verb, Crivelli (2012, 154-157) suggests that Plato is making the distinction between the 
different senses of the verb in its incomplete senset. As we will discuss, I prefer Jean 
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example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas 
the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly 
(1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of 'degrees of reality' for 'degrees of 
being/existence' must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the 
basic sense of being for Plato is 'something like propositional structure, involving 
both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of 
predication' (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction 
terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only 
second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which 
is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading,
1
 Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while 
both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and 
belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and 
thus does not imply TW.
2
 Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying 
that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in 
favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more 
obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that 'it would be safer 
to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of 
existence' (1970, 46). 
                                                                                                                                          
Roberts’ idea that Sophist can 'in no useful way' be described as a distinguishing of 
different senses of being (1998, 142). Vlastos thinks that while Plato’s use of being in 
Sophist (regarding ordinary and Paulin predication) is ambiguous, he is himself unaware 
of the ambiguity (1973, 270-308). 
1One problem with Fine’s veridical reading is that it cannot be compatible with texts which 
are more suggestive of objects. As Gonzalez points out (1996, 262), Fine’s veridical 
reading means that when Plato says at 476e-477a that knowledge is of something (τί), he 
is suggesting that only true propositions are something and also the passage at 478b-c 
must entail that false propositions are nothing. The impossibility of believing what is not 
must imply, in Fine’s veridical reading, that it is impossible to believe what is false or 
absolutely false. Fine tries to solve this last problem with the distinction of false and 
'totally false' or 'very false' belief (2003, 76). Fine’s answer to the problem of the meaning 
of both being true and not true about belief is that it is 'partly true and partly false, or near 
the mark' (ibid, 70). Fine's claim that her veridical reading has its own privilege and 
makes the argument’s conclusion more attractive is challenged by Annas since it leads to 
degrees of truth which does not make any more sense than that of degrees of existence 
(1981, 198). 
2
 To escape TW, Fine tries to reduce the difference to contents and not objects. The 
prisoners’ inferior level of knowledge, she says, is not because they see the images of 
physical objects and not the objects themselves but because 'they cannot systematically 
discriminate between images and the objects they are of'. (1998, 248)  
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1. Being, Not-Being and Difference 
The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of 
being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus,and specifically the first two we 
try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and 
revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of 
"same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the 
notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is 
because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding 
being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" 
can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based 
on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of 
Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being 
cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ 
understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the 
same but different in every moment.
1
 The relation of being and sameness reaches to 
its highest point in Parmenides.
2
 What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing 
but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this 
new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same 
but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, 
with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being. 
At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be 
without partaking (μετε ́χειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of 
being and one: 
 
So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία του ̑ ἑνὸς) which is not 
the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one 




The fact that what is (ἔστι) signifies (σημαῖνον) is other (ἀλλο) than what 
One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction.
4
 The conclusion 
                                                 
1
The opposition of the same and difference can be seen in his famous words that 'on those 
stepping into rivers staying the same (τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν) different and different (ἕτερα 
καὶ ἕτερα) water flow' (Diels-Kranz (DK), Fr.39). The result is, for Heraclitus, a 
paradox: 'into the same river we step and do not step, we are and are not (εἶμέν τε καὶ 
οὐκ εἶμέν) (Graham (2010), F. 65). 
2
He asserts again and again that only being is and it is impossible for not being to be (DK, 
Fr.2.3, 5-6, 4.2, 6.1-2, 7.1, 8.2) and not being is unthinkable and unsayable (DK, Fr. 2.7-
8, 3, 8.8-9) and it is all the same (ξυνὸν) (DK, Fr. 5.1). 
3Though I used Cooper’s (ed.) translation (1997) for Plato’s texts, I was not totally commited 
to it and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was 
needed. 
4
Dancy (1991, 97) correctly points to Sophist 244b-245e as having the same echo. 
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is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the 
other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 
143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor 
One but "difference": 
 
So if being is something different (ἕτερον) and one something different 
(ἕτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its 
being being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other 
(ἕτερα ἀλλήλων) by difference (τῷ ἑτερῳ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6) 
 
The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of 
difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, 
it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). 
When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge 
of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains 
to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such: 
 
For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says 
that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in 
kind. (160e1-2) 
 
Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look 
at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for 
"difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the 
"difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being 
is still attached to the same: 
 
For that which is the same is being (ὄν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταὐτόν) (162d2-3). 
 
The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new 
understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow 
resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between 
being and becoming (248a7-8) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body 
and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with 
our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by 
adding: 
 
You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ 
ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ 
ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13) 
 
That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) 
matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because 
being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e). It 
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does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be 
admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates 
would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two 
parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The 
solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what 
changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both 
the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, 
like a child, for both and say being (τὸὄν) is both the unchanging and that which 
changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of 
contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are 
(250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them 
rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate 
with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but 
different (ἕτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to 
take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated 
relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now 
trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a 
crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility 
of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s 
clear that change is not being and also is being (ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ 
ὄν) since it partakes in being?' (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that 
becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being 
and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement 
at Republic 477a about what both is and is not. 
At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in 
which the same (ταὐτὸν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest 
and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both 
(b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct 
things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-
c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is 
the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to 
assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are 
distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to 
get able to draw the relation of being and difference: 
 
But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said 
(λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) but some [are said] always 




The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸδέγ’ ἕτερον ἀεὶ 
πρὸς ἕτερον) (255d1). It pervades1 all kinds because each of them should be 
different from the others and is so due to the difference and not its own nature 
(253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and 
is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by 
making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this 
association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the 
same time, the issue that its version at RepublicV made all those controversies we 
discussed above: 
 
So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα 
ἐξ ἀναγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν). Τhat’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of 
the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it 
different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are 
not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that 
they are because they partake in being. (Sophist 256d11-e3) 
 
Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to 
thedifference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding 
being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. 
Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, 
based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not 
only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the 
contrary of being anymore but only different (ἕτερον) (257b3-4).  
Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed 
for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) 
says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y',
2
 I totally 
disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought 
that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be 
different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). 
Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and 
the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being 
as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X is not beautiful 
because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show 
how something can both be and not be the same thing.
3
 The difference is what makes 
                                                 
1
 At 259a5-6, both being and difference are said as what pervade all and each other. 
2
Also cf. Hintikka (1973, 26): 'precisely a replacement of the idea of not-being by that of 
difference'. 
3
 Frede’s statement that 'Plato does not identify being with difference but with a particular 
Form or kind of difference' (1992, 408) is misleading. Plato does not take being as 
difference nor as the Form of difference. Being and difference are separated from each 
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one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference with the 
ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion of 
difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the simultaneous 
being and not being of a thing: 'What we call
1
 "not-beautiful" is the thing that 
ἕτερόν ἐστιν from nothing other than του ̑ καλου ̑ φύσεως' (257d10-11).2 The 
result is that not beautiful happens to be (συμβέβηκεν εἶναι) one single thing 
among kinds of beings (τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους) and at the same time set 
over against one of the beings (πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν) (257e2-
4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful (εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ 
μὴ καλόν); a being set over against being (ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις) (e6-7). 
Neither the beautiful is more a being (μα ̑λλον ... ἐστι τῶν ὄντων) nor not 
beautiful less (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are (ὁμοίως εἶναι) 
(258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again (a7-9), owes to θατέρου φύσις 
now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that are of the nature of 
the difference and set over each other in being (τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα 
ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις) is being as being itself is being (αὐτοῦ τοῦὄν 
τοςοὐσία ἐστιν) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary of, each 
other (a11-b3). This is exactly τὸμὴὄν, the subject of the inquiry (b6-7).3 Hence, not 
                                                                                                                                          
other but share in each other. Plato interprets being by difference but he does not identify 
being neither with it norwith a particular kind of it. 
1
 The word in use is φθεγγόμεθα. Kostman (1973, 198) suggests reading it 'is predicated' 
instead of 'is called'. We preferred, however, to use the less technical word 'is called' for 
the simple reason that it does not seem to be applied in a different sense than its normal 
use.      
2
Kostman (1973, 198) takes this sentence as an evidence of rejecting the standard view (cf. 
Ross (1951, 115), Owen (1971, 238-240)) of reading  ἕτερον, based on which it means 
'non-identical'. The fact that Plato makes not-beautiful different from nothing but (οὐκ 
ἄλλου τινὸς) the nature of beautiful shows that we cannot translate it simply to 'non-
identical'. It is actually non-identical with every other thing, but it is ἕτερον only from 
the nature of beautiful. Nonetheless, I cannot understand how this passage can be 
consistent with Kostman’s own translation of it as 'incompatible' (1973, 205-206). As I 
wish this paper show, the only acceptable interpretation of the word that can be applicable 
to all the passages, at least in Sophist, is what will be suggested in this paper as pollachos 
esti. 
3
Some scholarsmake their endeavor to resolve the contradictories of Plato’s explanation of 
not-being by distinguishing between different senses of it, which, I think, might be of any 
assistance to the problem. Lewis (1977), for instance, considers an 'essential' dichotomy 




being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἶδοςamong the many things that are (b9-
c3). 
Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis 
of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the 
stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference 
that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and 
difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, 
only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different 
from it (259a6-8).
1
 Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ 
ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1). 
2. Difference and the Being of a Copy 
We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made 
so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. 
Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. 
The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem.  Plato’s analogy of 
original
2
-copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has 
obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the 
ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 
'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the 
difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or 
reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational?  
By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ 
suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, 
pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of 
"degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are 
some of Plato’s words in Republic3 as well as Plato’s words in some other dialogues1 
                                                 
1Cornford’s (1935, 295 n.2) distinction of two statements seems unnecessary. He 
distinguishes between two, i) that the difference is not the same as Being, but still is 
existent and ii) that the different is not a thing that is (viz. a certain existent) but is a thing 
that is. The second dilemma seems indeed to be a wrong one. It is not said that difference 
is not a certain existent. Its existence is,actually, what it insists on when it is said that the 
difference is.  
2
Tanner (2010, 94) notes that the translation of paradigm to original is problematic. The 
sense of pattern and example of paradigm is not implied enough by original.   
3
Words like παντελῶς ὄν (477a), τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος (477a, 478d, 479d), τελέως ὄν 
(597a), κλίνης ὄντως οὔσης (597d), μα̑λλον ὄντα (515d), μα̑λλον ὄντων (585d). 
What I think on the case is that Plato’s epithets like παντελῶς or μα̑λλον, capable 
enough to be taken as hinting to degree must be interpreted, as Cooper points out, based 
on the fact that Plato’s theory of being 'is so difficult to express without straining 
language to its limits' (1986, 242). 
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(1998, 219). When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, purely or 
perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable (1998, 229); an 
obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one.
2
 He thinks that when in 
Republic we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than its Form, it is 
because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being adulterated by 
contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain understanding of it 
(1998, 222).  
Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology 
thinking that 'to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the 
close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"'
3
 (1980, 213). He 
thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understοοd as being rather than reality, τὸὄν as 
"that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that 
degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of 
being. Allen believes that a 'purely epistemic' reading of the passage in Republic is 
patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of 
reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper 
suggests gets close to this paper’s solution: 
 
Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the 
way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are 
different grades of ontological status.
4
 (1986, 241) 
 
A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a 
copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy 
as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is 
relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 
1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; 
they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence 
from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of 
existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, 
things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to Phaedo 
where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be 
                                                                                                                                          
1
 He also refers to: εἰλικρινές at Sym. 211e, τὸ ὄν ὄντως at Phil. 59d, οὐσία ὄντως οὔσα 
at Phds. 247c, ὄντως οὐδέποτε ὄν at Tim. 28a 
2Vlastos agrees that his doctrine is 'a lucid consequence of Plato’s epistemology' (1998, 229). 
3
 From another point of view, asCynthia Hampton (1998, 240) points, though the ontological 
and epistemological senses of reality might be distinguished, the epistemic sense 
ultimately depends on the ontological sense.  
4
Actually, Vlastos himself opposes his view of degrees of reality that is 'a difference in 
degree between beings of the same kind' to what will somehow be our solution to the 
problem namely, 'a difference in kind between different kinds of being'. (1954, 340) What 
Allen says (1998, 63) is somehow the same. 
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like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. white
1
 
(1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a 
doctrine of particulars as images and semblances but come to such a view after 
Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him 
about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him 
that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last 
pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing 
to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, 
Timaeus and RepublicVI-VII besides the last pages of book V.
2
 
The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in RepublicV can be 
reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist.
3
 We can find 
out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he 
assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s 
key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a 
copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology. 
In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not 
being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and 
Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-
9). At 237c1-4, the problem of "not being" is noticed in a new way which shows 
some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being.  Nevertheless, 
not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech 
(238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), 
the solution to the problem appears:  the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy 
is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς 
                                                 
1
White (1977, 200) insists on the fact that there is no mention of εἰκόνες, ὁμοιώματα or 
μιμήματα for particulars in Phaedo. He also (ibid, 201) denies the use of εἶδωλα at 
Sym. 212 as a reference to the reflection theory (1977, 201). 
2Scolnicov’s claim (2003, 65) about an ontological difference between paradigm and what 
resembles it in Parmenides 132-133 has no textual evidence to rely on and the word he 
mentions, εἰκασθη̑ναι, is not enough. Nonetheless, I believe that the ontological 
difference of a paradigm and its image is a developed version of the simple resemblance 
theory to which Plato was committed in Parmenides. Contrary to those like Runciman 
who think that 'asymmetrical resemblance is a contradiction in terms' (1959, 158), 
itseems not only possible but also the ground of one of the differences of Plato’s theory of 
paradigm with his previous theory of resemblance. That Plato's theory in Parmenides was 
not based on the non-reciprocal relation is obvious from Coxon’s note. Referring to some 
texts including Parmenides 139e and 140b, Coxon (1999, 110) points that the fact that 
Plato brings τὸ ταὐτὸν πεπονθός as the definition of "the like" shows that the concept 
of a non-reciprocal likeness was unknown to Parmenides of Parmenides besides the 
historical Parmenides. 
3
This is not claimed only here in this paper. Cf. Palmer, 1999, 144 
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τἀληθινὸν) but still is 'another such thing (ἕτεροντοιου ̑τον)' (240a8). 
Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In 
answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing 
(240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἐοικὸςμὲν (240b2). A 
copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a 
resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it 
is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely 
and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικὸς is opposed to 
ὄντως ὄν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like 
(ἐοικὸς) is not really that which is (οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὄν)'. But still a copy 'is in a 
way (ἔστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has 
its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως) (b11). The 
Stranger asks: 
 
So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν) but it really is what 
we call a likeness (ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13) 
 
This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being. 
Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with 
that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but 
only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status 
intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image, 
in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and 
has real being' because otherwise 'it would be an ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,essentially and 
really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as 
folows: 
i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν). 
ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἕτερον). 
iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινο ́ν) as that of which it is a copy but only 
that which is like it (ἐοικὸς). 
iv) It is not really that which really is (ὄντως ὄν) but only really a likeness (εἰκων 
ὄντως).  
The conclusion is that: 
v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of 
interweaving being with not being. 
This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that 
which is not somehow is (τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι)' and 'that which is, somehow is not 
(τό ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have 
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also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of 
this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3). 
In Timaeus, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus 
we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιου ̑τον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" 
(τὸ διἀ παντὸς τοιου ̑τον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) 
which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word 
τοιου ̑τον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its 
original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything 
is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and 
separated from its image.
1
 
Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about 
the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism 
of the relational theory. What we are being said in Timaeus, he thinks,cannot be 
explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. 
What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, 
means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but 
only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its 
best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following. 
3. πολλαχῶς ἔστι 
The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see 
first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato 
brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of pollachos legetai is a 
brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, 
however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach 
                                                 
1
The explanation of the being of a copy and its difference with its original can be seen at 
52c2-d1: 
 
Since that for which an image has come to be is not at all intrinsic to the 
image, which is invariably appearance of something different (ἑτερουδέ 
τινος), it stands to reason that the image should therefore come to be in 
something else (ἐν ἑτέρῳ … τινὶ), somehow clinging to being (οὐσίας 
ἁμωσγέπως ἀντεχομένην) or else be nothing at all (ἢ μηδὲν τὸ 
παράπαν αὐτὴν). But that which really is (ὄντως ὄντι) receives support 
from the accurate true account -that as long as the one is distinct from the 
other, neither of them ever comes to be in the other in such a way that they at 
the same time become one and the same, and also two. 
 
As far as it is related to our discussion, this passage aims to demonstrate that the 
copy must be different from its original, but it must, at the same time, be kind of 
being though it cannot be a real being as its original is. 
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to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle 
in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our 
reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much 
repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works,1 is his resolution for some of the ontological 
problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense.
2
 Aristotle 
is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides 
and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a 
creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers 
were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will 
discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the 
same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in 
Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine.  
1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of 
several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to 
understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic.  
a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of 
pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being: 
 
Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by 
reference to one (πρὸς ἕν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ 
φύσιν).3 (Metaphysics 1003a33-34) 
 
                                                 
1
E.g., Met.: 1003a33, b5, 1018a35-36, 1026a33-34, b2, 1028a10, 13-14 (τοσαυταχῶς … 
ὄντος), 1030a17-18 (τὸ τί ἐστι πλεοναχῶς λέγεται), a21 (τὸ ἔστιν ὑπάρχει πα̃σιν 
ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὁμοίως), 1042b25-26 (τὸ ἔστι τοσαυταχῶς λέγεται), 1060b32-33, 
1089a7, Phy.: 185a21, b6, 206a21 (πολλαχως τὸ εἴναι)  
2
At Metaphysics 992b18-19, Aristotle criticizes Presocratics asserting: 'if we inquire the 
elements of existing things without distinguishing the various senses in which things are 
said (πολλαχῶς λεγομένον) to be, we cannot succeed'. In Physics, he criticizes 
Lycophron and his associates in the idea that the word 'is' must be omitted because they 
thought 'as if one or being are said in one sense (ὡς μοναχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ἑνος ἢ 
τοῦ ὄντος)' (185b31-32). His attack to Parmenides (Phy. 186a22 ff.) is based on the 
same ground. Parmenides’ assumption that being is said without qualification (ἁπλῶς 
λαμβάνει τὸ ὄν λέγεσθαι) is false because it is said in several senses (λεγομένου 
πολλαχῶς) (186a24-25). Parmenides’ hypothesis that 'being means [only] one thing (τὸ 
ὄν σημαίνειν ἕν)' (186b4) is the basis of his problems (186a32-b3) and if we analyze 
his theory correctly, as Aristotle himself does (b4-12), it follows that being must have 
more than one meaning (b12). 
3I used Barnes’ translation (1991) for Aristotle’s texts, but I was not totally commited to it 
and changed it based on the Greek text wherever a more strict translation was needed. 
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The doctrine of pros hen which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides 
the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic 
theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of 
the same word. The pros hen implementation of being is to provide an alternative for 
the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being 
which says being is said in one sense (kath hen) (1060b 32-33). That both the pros 
hen and the kath hen implementation of a word has one thing (hen) as what is 
common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does 
not consider anything in common. Whereas both pros hen and kath hen assume a 
common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of 
relation, their difference is that while kath hen takes all the implementations of the 
word as the same with the common nature, pros hen makes them different. Substance 
is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily:  
 
For as is (τὸ ἔστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way 
(οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary 
way.  So too τὸτί ἐστιν belongs simply (ἁπλῶς) to substance but in a limited 
sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23). 
 
The word ἁπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make 
substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν 
πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (ἁπλῶς) the 
ἕν, the common nature, τὸὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the 
being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident.  
The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction 
between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (pros) the 
substance is said to be. The doctrine of pros hen, changing kath hen to pros hen in 
respect of to on, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of 
implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is 
called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of pros 
hen it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a 
common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing 
itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by 
referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that: 
 
Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to 
be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, 
others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or 
privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20)1 
 
                                                 
1
See also at the beginning of Z (1028a10-13). 
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Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be are 
said only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is 
what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of pollachos 
legetai,pros hen and the theory of substance.  
b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the 
accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the 
accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (Metaphysics 1026b13-
14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was 'in a sense 
not wrong' saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) because the 
arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the 
beginning of book , he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a 
being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ̕ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν) in an 
unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22). 
The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of 
pollachos legetai, pros hen and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents 
almost as not being, comparedwith substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call 
Pollachos Legetai (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this 
structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation 
which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is 
said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (pros) to it. Adding 
Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and 
difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-
copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and 
the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to 
(pros) a model; it is different from (ἕτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself 
a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὄντως ὄν) but only is in a way 
(πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the 
theory of pollachos legetai and pros hen, we can observe its fundamental similarity 
with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure.1 
Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and 
particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is 'something intermediate between 
univocity and full equivocity' (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it 
pros hen (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the 
                                                 
1
Cornford notes that Aristotle must have learnt his pollachos legetai from Parmenedes II and 
its countless discussions (1939, 110-111). The view that Aristotle’s theory of categories 
developed as a result of his reflection on TM as suggested by some commentators like 
Vlastos (1954, 335) and Owen (1975) is not far from our comparison because I think 
Plato’s theory of original-shadow is itself developed because of TM. Aristotle’s theory 
might then be observed as a result of his reflection on Plato’s original-copy model which 
was Plato’s own solution to TM. 
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complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible 
differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original 
and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As 
substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident 
model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character 
between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well.  
Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are 
also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the 
predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the 
mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, 
as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being 
is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many 
senses… It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' 
(1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in 
the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it 
is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato 
was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with 
accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-
being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What 
helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἁπλῶς 
and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ᾕ) which is directly linked with his 
distinction between καθ’ αὑτο λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used 
to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He 
strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed 
to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then 
continues: 
 
We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said 
simply (ἁπλως) to come from not being (μὴὄντος). But nevertheless we 
maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτο μὴ ὄν, nothing can 
become.
1
 (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25)  
 
Our use of Aristotle’s theory as a prelude to explain Plato’s ontology does not 
intend to claim that their solutions are the same but only that they have the same 
structure with almost the same parts. There is still, among many possible differences, 
a fundamental difference between two theories: whereas Plato tries to solve the 
problem of Parmenidean being and not being by refusing Parmenides’ being through 
a new kind of being that both is and is not, Aristotle resolves the problem from a 
                                                 
1Aristotle’s solution for the paradox of Meno by distinguishing two senses is also noteworthy 
(P. An. 71a29-b8). 
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different point of view. His solution does not need a third ontological status besides 
being and not being including things that both are and are not because he is still in a 
Parmenidean position: 'We do not subvert the principle that everything either is or is 
not' (Physics 191b26-27). Aristotle’ criticism of those who bring the indefinite dyad 
besides one, can be admissibly accepted as a reference to Plato and the Academy. 
Their problem, from Aristotle’s point of view, was that they framed the difficulty in 
an old-fashioned way based on Parmenides’ saying that it is impossible for not being 
to be (Metaphysics 1089a4). They are under Aristotle’s criticism not because they 
kept Parmenides’ principle but because they thought they have to resolve the 
problem by rejecting it: 'they thought it necessary to prove that which is not is' 
(1089a5, cf. a19). This undoubtedly refers to Sophist where Plato rejects the 
principle. Aristotle’s solution is different from Plato in this very point. He does not 
think that the problem must be solved in an old-fashioned way trying to refuse 
Parmenidean being but by Pallachus Legetai without needing to present a third 
ontological status. Have I been able to show that Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is 
comparable with Plato’s solution; I call his solution Pollachos Esti.1 What this 
changing of legetai to esti is intended to show is not the change of a linguistic to an 
ontological theory since not only the former’s being linguistic is not to be claimed 
here
2
 but we are not going to claim that the latter’s theory is ontological in a merely 
existential sense.  
                                                 
1Though this phrase we chose as the name of Plato’s theory is based on Aristotle’s phrase, it 
had been used somehow by Plato himself. In the previously mentioned passage about the 
relation of being and difference in Sophist (259a-b) we have Stranger saying: 
 
Being (τὸ ὄν) has a share in the difference, so, being different from all of the 
others, it is not each of them and is not all of the others except itself. So 
being (τὸ ὄν) indisputably is not millions of things and both is in many ways 
(πολλαχῇ μὴν ἔστι) each and all of them and is not in many ways 
(πολλαχῇ δ’οὐκ ἔστιν) [each and all of them] (259b1-6). 
At 256e5-6 we are told that: 
περὶ ἕκαστον ἄρα τῶν εἰδῶν πολὺ μέν ἐστι τὸ ὄν, ἄπειρονπλήθειδὲ τὸ  μ
ὴ ὄν. 
And at 263b11-12: 
πολλὰ μὲν γὰρ ἔφαμενὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ 
  ὄντα. 
2
 Nonetheless, it is not wrong to say that Aristotle deals with the issue more from an 
epistemological point of view or at least not from a view as ontological as Plato’s. That 
either Aristotle’s Pollachos Legetai is linguistic (cf. Saches 1948. Ackrill (1963, 75f.) 
argues against linguistic reading), logical (cf. Kung 1999, 199-200)or ontological (cf. 
Fine 2003, 345), is out of the boundaries of this paper. What my short analysis can imply 
is only that the difficulty of Parmenidean being and not being is to be resolved by 
Pollachos Legetai from an epistemological point of view. I do not say linguistic because 
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Therefore, before Aristotle’s theory of different senses of being as the solution 
of his predecessors’ ontological problem, Plato had resolved the problem by a 
thoroughly different version of what Aristotle used later. His solution is based on the 
notion of difference: things that are something (F), are so in different ways. Suppose 
that we have three things, 1) Φ as the Form, 2) φ as one of the particulars and 3) f as 
the shadow of that particular, all are called by the same name, F.  All of these three 
things are thus F. Not only the Form of the beautiful (Φ) is beautiful (F) but also one 
particular beautiful (φ) as well as its shadow (f).1 The point is that while they all are 
beautiful (F), they are not so in the same way. The way in which f, the shadow of φ is 
F is different from the way in which φ is F as well as both of them are F in different 
ways from Φ, the form of F. The Form of beautiful, a beautiful flower and its image 
in a mirror all are beautiful but not in the same way. Let’s consider the following 
statements:  
i) The Form of the beautiful IS beautiful. 
ii) A flower Is beautiful. 
iii) Its image is beautiful. 
I used atypically three forms of the verb 'is' to show where the difference is 
relied on. We do not apply the 'is' in these sentences in the same way which is to 
mean that this 'is' is not the same in them.
2
 While ΦIS F, φIs F and f only is F. These 
differences in the shape of the verb are supposed to imply that the difference is in 
being. All the things which are one thing, are so differently because their being F is 
                                                                                                                                          
it has its own entailments. Logical may be the best word, but nowadays’ understanding of 
it might be misleading. We can be sure, however, that Aristotle’s analysis from an 
epistemological point of view does not mean for him a non ontological attitude: 
 
It is not because we think truly that you are white that you are white, but because 
you are white we who say that are saying the truth (Metaphysics 1051b6-9) 
1Though Allen agrees that based on "the logic of Plato’s metaphor" the picture of, for 
example, a hand is a hand, he thinks it is absurd because the picture only resembles that 
of which it is the picture, but it cannot itself be that: 'it is clearly false that reflection [of a 
scarf] is a scarf'. He concludes then, using Aristotle’s language, that we must distinguish 
between substantial and accidental resemblances (1998, 61-2). While I draw the attention 
to his connection of Plato’s theory and Aristotle’s theory of substance-accident, I think he 
can be misleading in the central point. All Plato’s theory is to fulfill is the explanation of 
this: how can both a Form and its participant or an original and its copy be the same 
thing? The theory of Pollachos Esti has this explanation as its aim. It wants to explain 
how a hand and its picture can both be hands. The solution the theory brings forth is that 
though they both are hands, they are so in different ways. This is exactly what Allen 
himself points to (ibid, 62). Therefore, if we say that the picture of a hand is not a hand, 
we are far from understanding both Plato’s problem and his solution.  
2
As Nehamas points out, when we say that particulars are only imperfectly F in comparison 
to the Form of F-ness, the imperfection belongs to the "being" rather than to the "F" in 
"being F". (1998, 79) 
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not the same in them. Therefore, difference is extended to all the cases in which it is 
said that each of them '… esti X'. It is absurd then to think, as from Aristotle onward 
we are used to, that when we say about different things that each of them 'is' 
something, X, all of them are that thing in the same way.As Allen says, the function 
"… is X" is 'systematically ambiguous' (1998, 62). Based on Aristotelian 
understanding of universal, there is no difference in the way of using 'is' in all the 
cases of a universal when it is said that each of them 'is' that universal. Though 
maybe not explicitly stated, it is indeed in the basis of the definition of a universal to 
be applicable to its cases in the same way. Based on this view, no difference is 
allowed in 'is' between two sentences of 'man is animal' and 'horse is animal'. Each of 
them 'is' animal in the same way. This is what Plato’s new theory of Pollachos Esti 
intends to change. I think Plato’s new model of original-copy is theorized to provide 
an explanation how this can happen. Both the original and its copy are the same 
things, but they differ in their way of being that thing. While both Socrates and his 
reflex in water is Socrates, they are so in different ways, that is, by different ways of 
being Socrates. Any reduction of this difference to degrees or levels or anything like 
this does not, therefore, state Plato’s theory in its full and correct sense.1 
In Plato’s theory, thus, all things which are one thing are (not: are called as in 
Aristotle) so (a) not in the same way but in different ways and (b) by reference to 
(pros) the Form of that thing. All things that are, for instance, beautiful, are so in 
different ways and by reference to the Form of the beautiful. When Plato says then 
that the object of knowledge is what purely is (ει ̓λικρινῶς ὄντος) (478d6-7) but the 
object of opinion which both is and is not ου ̓δέτερον εἰλικρινὲς ο ̓ρθω̑ς α ̓́ν 
προσαγορευόμενον (478e2-3), what is intended is their difference in their being. 
Φ, the Form of F, φ, a particular F and f, an image of F, are differently F. This is 
applying difference and plurality not to the simple and absolute being but to being a 
certain thing. What Plato discovers here, which I think can be observed as his most 
innovative ontological discovery, is, if we are allowed to use Aristotle’s phraseology, 
finding difference and plurality in universality and the way each case of a universal 
is that universal. The concept of F which was a universal concept equally applicable 
to its instances, is now broken by difference to different ways of being F. This 
ontology seems to extend pluralism to its boundaries.
2
 Not only is the difference of 
                                                 
1
 Gonzalez’ idea (1996, 261) is noteworthy: 
 
To be fully F is to exist fully. On this view, what is absurd is not the notion 
of degrees of existence but the modern notion that a sensible object can be 
imperfectly beautiful and yet perfectly exist, that its beauty and existence can 
be kept so distinct that the imperfection of the one does not affect the other.  
2Plato’s remedy for this radical plurality includes i) his theory of Forms which tries to bind 
these different things and ii) his theory of the Good = One that is the binding bind of all 
things. The theory of difference breaks being more than ever to different parts, but it does 
not make problem for Plato because being is not anymore the guardian of unity. The 
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different things presupposed here, it expands the sphere of differentiation to the 
difference of the same things: even the things that are the same thing, F, differ from 
each other in their very being F.  
Vlastos is right that Plato does not say that the objects that the lovers of sights 
and sounds love, do not exist or only half exist (1998, 223) but it does not mean that 
Plato, as he thinks, wants their reality to be the case. What is neglected by both 
Vlastos’ theory of degrees of reality and Allen and others’ theory of particulars as 
relational entities is Plato’s theory of "difference in being". The theory of degrees of 
reality may be successful in escaping degrees of existence but not only goes far from 
the ontological aspect of Plato’s solution but also neglects the notion of difference. 
The relational theory, on the other hand, while does not focus sufficiently on 
difference as the basis of Plato’s theory has an excessive stress on the relational 
character of a copy in the original-copy model. 
 
*** 
As we could say in Aristotle that only substance can really be called 'being' and 
all the accidents are called so only in favor of, and referring to, substance;it is right,in 
Plato’s philosophy, to say that only Φ, the Form, really is F (IS F) and all the φs as 
well as all fs are F only in favor of, and referring to,Φ. How should we interpret this 
'is'? existential, predicative or veridical? This '… is', first, should not be understood 
in an absolute and simple way but as being of something and as '…is X'. This means 
that it cannot, at least at the first sight, be simply applied to existence. I say 'at the 
first sight' because we cannot see Plato concerned with the simply existential use of 
'is' when it is meant by it only that something exists. Nevertheless, we cannot say that 
it is free from any existential sense because he has not excluded it from 'is X'. 
Although it is right that when it is said that something 'is X' it does not mean directly 
that it exists, it seems that it also implies the existence in Plato. Besides Plato’s way 
of treating with the problem of false belief as an evidence of this, the fact that neither 
Plato nor Aristotle distinguished the existential 'is' even when it is expected, for 
example in Aristotle when he distinguished the different senses of being, shows that 
we have to consider it as attached to other used of the verb.  
Regarding the other senses of being like predicative and veridical sense, it can 
be said that in spite of the fact that Plato does not distinguish between these senses, 
Pollachos Esti applies difference to both of these senses of 'is'. Having some kind of 
existential sense in itself, the 'is' can thus be considered propositional, predicative 
and veridical at the same time but neither of them alone. The simultaneous being and 
not being of a particular, φ, which is F, but, at the same time, is not F, will be 
explained in this way: the predicate of F can be predicated on φ but it cannot be 
                                                                                                                                          
relation of being and one is ruptured at least in Republic since the duty of unifying is 
given to the One which is the Good and not the being but beyond being and superior to it 
(Republic 509b).  
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predicated at the same time because while φ Is F, it IS not F if we remind that only 
Φ, the Form of F, IS F. The F-ness of φ is true about it because it Is F, but it is false 
at the same time because it IS not F. The same can be said about TW. It does not 
matter whether we consider two worlds or one (cf. Perl, 1999, 351) only if we have 
in mind that the relation of them must be kept as the relation which is explained in 
the allegories of Sun, Cave and Line. Being the closest theory to the suggestion of 
this paper, Allen’s explanation of Plato’s theory is not yet Pollachos Esti. His 
interpretation, however, gets to almost the same point: 
 
Though you may call the reflection of a red scarf red if you so please, you 
cannot mean the same thing you mean when you call its original red 
(1998, 62). (my Italic) 
 
Plato’s use of the phrases παντελῶς ὄν(477a2) εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος(477a7, 
478d6-7) and τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς(479d5) in Republic should be read as making 
qualifications on being. Any effort to reduce Plato’s being in Republic to existential, 
veridical or predicative senses is anachronistic because these distinctions are mostly 
based on either modern ontology or Aristotle’s distinction which Plato never made. 
This is obvious even from Aristotle’s criticism that Plato tried to resolve the 
difficulty in an old-fashioned way trying to reject Parmenides. The theory of 
Pollachos Esti can be understood only on the basis of the absence of pollachos 
legetai and the theory of pollachos legetai when it is criticizing Plato, as we saw, can 
be understood only based on the fact that Plato, in Aristotle’s point of view, does not 






















The Standard Chronology of Plato’s Dialogues 
 
 
While the ancient philosophers, doxographers and commentators from 
Aristotle onward considered, more or less, the question of the date and arrangement 
of the dialogues (cf. Irwin 2008, 77 n. 69), they didnot observe a firm necessity to 
consider the progress of Plato’s theories in dialogues, maybe because they did not 
think of any essential shift in there.
1
We might be able to say, nevertheless, that the 
most prominent feature of the ancient attitude to Plato was its peculiar attention to 
the Republic and the Timaeus as the most mature works
2
 in his philosophyand also 
itsconsideration of Laws as a later work. This tendency can be discovered from the 
general viewpoint of the first chronologies of the early 19th century after starting to 
deal with the issue. That Schleiermacher observed Republic as the culmination of 
Plato’s philosophy and as one of the latest dialogues besides Laws and Timaeus 
could reflex the implicit chronology of the tradition in the first mirrors it found. 
Another tendency in Schleiermacher is taking the triology of Theaetetus, Sophist and 
Politicus as relatively early. 
From the last quarter of 19
th
century onward, stylometry helped scholars to 
establish a new framework to constructa new arrangement between the dialogues. 
Based on stylistic as well as literary findings, Campbell (1867, xxxff.) argued for the 
closeness of the style of Sophist
3
 and Politicuswith Timaeus, Critias, Philebusand 
Lawsthat, especially because of the certain evidence about this last dialogue’s 
lateness, led to the consideration of all as late dialogues. Almost every other stylistic 
effort after Campbell approved the similarities between Sophist and Politicus with 
Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Laws. The result of all such investigations led to a 
                                                 
1
Plato first became familiar with Heraclitean doctrine of flux and the impossibility of knowledge of 
changing things, Aristotle says, and had the same idea in his later years (Met. 987a32-b1). 
Aristotle’s way of treating with the theory of Forms can be a good evidence for this. He thinks, 
it seems to me, that all the reasons Plato provides for his theory must be considered as 
coexistent efforts alongside each other, none of them substituting the other. Even when he 
criticizes the theory of Forms as paradigms which, I think, has the echo of implying its being a 
later solution (τó δελέγεινπαραδείγματααὐταεῖ͗ναι ...Met. 991a20-22), he does not take the 
change serious. 
2
 It is an irresistable tendency even in modern chronologists. Cf. e.g.Thesleff, 1989, 11 about 
Republic. 
3
 The abbreviations for the dialogues are so: Apology (Ap.), Charmides (Ch.), Clitophon (Clit.), 
Cratylus (Cra.), Critias (Cri.), Criton (Cr.), Epinomis (Epi.), Epistles (Eps.), Euthydemus 
(Euthd.), Euthyphron (Euthp.), Gorgias (Grg.), Hippias Major (H. Ma.), Hippias Minor (H. Mi.), 
Laches (Lach.), Laws (La.), Lysis (Ly.), Menexenus (Mene.), Parmenides (Par.), Phaedo (Ph.) 
Phaedrus (Phd.), Philebus (Phil.), Politicus (Pol.), Protagoras (Pr.), Republic (Rep.), Symposium 
(Sym.), Theaetetus (Tht.), Timaeus (Tim.) 
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new chronology that, despite some differences, has a fixed structure in all its 
appearances. 
 
The current chronologies are mostly based on the arrangement of dialogues to 
three groups corresponding to three periods of Plato’s life, which became 
predominant after applying stylistic features in assessing the similarities between 
dialogues. The fact that all the stylometric considerations reached to the similar 
results about the date of dialogues while they were assessing different stylistic 
aspects helped the new chronology become prevailing not only among stylistic 
chronologies but also between those like Fine, Kahn and Vlastos who were inclined 
more to the content-based arrangements. Even this latter group could not neglect the 
apparently certain results of using the method of stylometry. This was the main 
reason, I think, that made what they called content-based chronology be under the 
domination of stylometry much more than they could expect. The division of the 
dialogues into three separate groups became something that most of the scholars took 
for granted so far as Kahn thinks this division 'can be regarded as a fixed point of 
departure in any speculation about the chronology of the dialogues'
1
 (1996, 44). 
Thereafter, all the chronologists are accustomed to divide the dialogues to three 
groups of early, middle and late corresponding to the three stages of Plato’s life. 
Nevertheless, some of them tried to make subdivisions among each group and 
introduce some of the dialogues as transitional between different periods and thus 
reached to a fourfold classification of the dialogues. Although theycould never 
achieve to a consensus about the place of some dialogues, about which we will 
discuss soon, the whole spirit of theirchronological arrangements is the same and 
thus compelling enough for us to unify all of them with the label of 'Standard
2
 
Chronology of Dialogues' (SCD). We brought together some of the most famous 
chronologies in the table below to make a comparison easier and to show how all are 
approximately of the same opinion about the place of some dialogues. 
The following points must be noted about this table: 
1. I divided the dialogues to eight groups of early, late early, transitional, early 
middle, late middle, post-middle, early late, and late. Although none of the 
chronologists applies this classification, it can be helpful to compare them. In this 
table, for example, if one of the chronologists beholds one of the dialogues as later 
than all the dialogues of middle group, it is considered here as late middle. 
Otherwise, if it is emphasized that it is after all of them, it is considered as post-
middle. The same is true about the dialogues of the late group in which I regarded the 
first dialogues of that period as early late only in those who explicitly considered 
                                                 
1
 Mackay (1928) points to the danger of taking threefold division of the dialogues as a warranted 
chronological order. 
2
 Regarding the label 'standard', as Irwin notes (2008, 77), it is a description of the new trend of 
arranging Plato’s dialogues used mostly by the scholars who want to criticize or reject it. Irwin, 
however, defends it. 
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some dialogues as earlier than other ones in the late group. Though, therefore, some 
of the dialogues might have not been considered as forming a distinct class, they are 
distinguished here.     
 






















































































































































































































































































































A. SCD’s Early and Transitional Dialogues 
The first group of dialogues in SCD includes what is called early or Socratic 
dialogues. Campbell’s first group of dialogues includes Apology, Charmides, 
Cratylus, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, 
Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Protagoras and Symposium.The first two groups 
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of Brandwood’s four groups corresponding to Campbell’s first group. He 
distinguished Cratylas, Euthydemus, Gorgias, Hippias Major (which was absent 
from all Campbell’s groups), Lysis, Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo and Symposium as 
the second group. Ledger (1989) also posits four groups. What is noticeable about 
histwo groups of 390s dialogues and 380s comparing Campbell and Brandwood’s, is 
that he extracts Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus from them and puts them 
besides Republic and other middle period dialogues. Meno and Phaedoare in his 380s 
dialogues. 
When we move from stylometric to content-based chronologies, the 
homogeneity between the dialogues of each group is more understandable. Guthrie 
(1975, v. 4, 50) distinguishes three groups, the first of them includes Apology, Crito, 
Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Protagoras, 
Gorgiasand Ion. In addition to Meno, Phaedo and Euthydems, his first group does 
not include Cratylus and Menexenus. Unlike Guthrie, almost all the other content-
based chronologiesof our study desire to distinguish two categories inside the first 
group of which the latter must be considered as the transitional group leading to the 
dialogues of the middle period. Kahn distinguishes four groups of dialogues and 
arranges two of them before middle period dialogues. The first group including 
Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor, Gorgiasand Menexenus he calls 'early' or 
'presystematic' dialogues (1998, 124). The second group he calls the 'threshold', 'pre-
middle' or 'Socratic' dialogues including seven: Laches, Charmides, Lysis, 
Euthyphro, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Meno. Based on Vlastos’ arrangement we 
must distinguish Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno as 
'transitional' dialogues from the 'elenctic' dialogues that are the other dialogues of 
Kahn’smentioned first two groups plus the first book of theRepublic. Fine also 
distinguishes 'transitional' dialogues from early or 'Socratic' dialogues,but her 
transitional dialogues are Gorgias, Meno, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Cratylus 
of which she thinks the last two dialogues are 'controversial' (2003, 1). Her Socratic 
dialogues are all the remaining dialogues of Kahn’s first two groups. 
In spite of all the differences between the mentioned chronologies, it can be 
seen that all of them are inclined to arrange the early dialogues in a way that: 
i) Besides the dialogues that are considered as late, it never includes Republic II-X, 
Theaetetus, Phaedras and Parmenides.  
 ii) It intends to consider the dialogues like Euthydemus and Hippias Majorthat look 
more critical as later among the earlier dialogues or as transitional group
1
.  
iii) Those who do not consider Meno as a middle period dialogue place it in their 
second or transitional group. 
iv) None of the content-based chronologies considers Phaedo and Symposium as 
early. Stylometric chronologies also intend to put them either as last dialogues 
among their early ones or as middle.  
                                                 
1
 Maybe we have to neglect Campbell as the only exception. 
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B. SCD’s Middle Period Dialogues 
Campbell listed Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus as his second 
group of dialogues, an idea thatwas accepted by Brandwood. Ledger’smiddle period 
dialogueshad Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus
1
  in addition to the dialogues 
that Campbell and Brandwood had mentioned as middle. Among content-based 
chronologies, Guthrie’s list of middle period dialogues did not include 
Parmenidesbut some dialogues which had been considered as early in stylometric 
ones: Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenusand 
Cratylus. In sofar as I know, Euthydemus and Menexenus havenot been considered as 
middle by other content-based chronologists and Guthrie is an exception among 
them. That Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium and Republic were middle period 
dialogues almost all the philosophical
2
 chronologists like Kahn, Fine, Vlastos (except 
Rep.I), Irwin andKraut came along. The dialogues they do not string along about are 
Meno, Cratylus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. Those like Guthrie, Kraut and Irwin 
who did not consider Meno as early presumably posit it among middles. The same 
can be said about Cratylus in the suggested chronologies of Guthrie, Kahn, Vlastos 
and Kraut. Nonetheless, it is different in case of Parmenides and Theaetetus. 
Whereas all the mentioned stylometric chronologists like Campbell, Brandwood and 
Ledger set them among middle period dialogues,the philosophical chronologists, it 
might seem at first, did not arrive at a consensus about them. While Guthrie and Fine 
put them as the first dialogues of the late group, Vlastos and Kraut set them as the 
latest of the middle  group, as well as Kahn who puts them as post-middle and 
amongst the late period dialogues. Regardless the way they classify their groups, 
their disagreement does not affect the arrangement of the dialogues: they all 
positParmenides and Theaetetusafter the series of Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, 
Symposiumand Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws. 
To sum up SCD’s arrangement of the middle period dialogues we can add:  
v) Republic and Phaedrus have been considered by all the mentioned chronologists 
as dialogues of the middle period. 
vi) All the philosophical chronologies have reached a consensus about setting 
Phaedo and Symposium alongside withRepublic and Phaedrus as middle. 
vii) While Stylometric alongside some philosophic chronologists arrangeParmenides 
and Theaetetus among their middle period dialoguesand mostly as the latest among 
them, other philosophical chronologists put them as the early among the late 
dialogues. We can conclude then that SCD intends to locate these two dialogues at 
the boundary between the middle and late period dialogues.  
                                                 
1
 Also Epistle 13 
2




C. SCD’s Late Dialogues 
SCD’s biggest consensus, both in style-based and in content-based 
chronologies is about the late dialogues. Campbell listed Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, 
Critias and Laws as his late group. Brandwood’s list has Epinomis and Epistles in 
addition and Ledger’s has Clitophon.1  That all the dialogues of Campbell’s list are 
late dialogues, all the mentioned philosophical chronologies are of the same opinion. 
The only difference is about locating Parmenides and Theaetetus as the first 
dialogues among late group or the latest among middle group. We can then say that 
in SCD: 
viii) Sophist, Politicus, Philibus, Timaeus, Critiasand Laws are considered by all as 
late. 
IX) All the above six dialogues must be dated after Parmenides and Theaetetus. 
Based on the above results out of a brief comparing of the chronologies, we 
are, I hope, permitted to draw the scheme of the standard chronology that can reflect 
the spirit of the current chronology. The aim of drawing this scheme is to determine 
the essential features of the current chronologies. We need SCD to be nearly 
determined because we need to have a fixed subject to challenge. We will try, 
however, to refer to the different ideas whenever it seems necessary. Now, let us 
draw a hypothetical scheme of SCDon the basis of the mentioned points of (i) to (ix) 
in the scheme (1) below.  
The following points must be noted about this scheme: 
2
 
1. I did not bring dialogues like Alcibiades I and II, Clitophon and some other 
dialogues their authenticity have been doubted by some of our chronologists. 
2. The arrangement of the dialogues that are listed under column I shows the results 
of points (i) to (ix) above. 
3. The dialogues mentioned in column II are those thathave been considered by the 
scholars either as early or as transitional but never as middle or late. 
                                                 
1
 Among Epistles Ledger mentions only Epistlesseven, three and eight as late.  
2
 Comparing with my SCD, Debra Nail’s (1998, cf. the table at p.173) endeavor to measure each of 
the style-based, Philosophy-based and content-based separately and to bring forth their 
uncontroversial results seems too stern. There are, in her conclusion, only three uncontroversial 
dialogues: Apology as early, Phaedrus and Repulic II-X as middle. The reason for this 
conclusion is that she brings Thesleff’s arrangement in his comparison (cf. the table at p.169) 
and alsoLeskey’s as a philosophical chronology. Though Leskey’s chronology has much in 
common with both stylistic and content-based chronologies, when she combines it with that of 
Thesleff, the outcome of the comparison of philosophical chronologies become completely 
different and, thus, does not present notable similarities between all kinds of chronologies. If, 
therefore, we exclude Thesleff’s and compare Lesky’s with other chronologies, the similarities 
will show up. Another reason for the difference between my similarities with that of Nail is that 
whereas she taks the classifications too strict, I try to pay more attention to the arrangements 
and not to the fixed boundaries of different groups. In my attitude, then, if, for example, 
Parmenides and Theaetetusare considered as the latest of the middle period in a chronology and 
as the earliest of the late period in another one, we took them as similar because this 
classification does not affect the arrangement. Consequently, the result of our categorizing is 
more about the place of some dialogues than the similarities between different groupings. 
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4. The dialogues of column III are those that have been taken either as early, 



































































































Stylometric Evidences of the Standard Chronology  
Both the scheme we drawn out in the previous section and the fact that it is the 
result of the stylometric evidences are points almost agreed upon: 
 
Since the advent of stylometry … all the parties to the dispute over the nature of 
Plato’s development would agree that the Euthyphro is an early dialogue; that 
the Phaedo and Republic are dialogues dating to Plato’s middle period, and that 
the Phaedo is the earlier of the two; that the Parmenides post-dates the Republic, 
and that the Sophist is among Plato’s latest works. (Prior, 1985, 168) 
 
That there must be some kind of stylometric development
1
 in Plato’s writing 
through the dialogues is beyond doubt. Nonetheless, there is, I think, a reasonable 
doubt about the role the stylometric evidences play in supporting SCD. It is generally 
agread that SCD owes much to the stylometric evidences as its first versions were 
suggested because of stylometric findings. This is what we are to examin here: How 
much SCD is right in relying on thestylometric evidences? I shall try to examine 
some of the stylometric evidences in this section
2
 emphasizing only on what each 
evidence alone implies, and not, necessarily, on what each scholar derives from 
every evidence.  
i) By calculating the increased use of the technical terminology of Timaeus, Critias 
and Laws in Plato’s other dialogues, Campbell (1867) found that the number of 
occurances of those technical words inSophist and Politicus are close to them. 
ii) Dittenberger’s examination of the usee of μη ́ν with certain other phrases showed 
that while Apology, Crito, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Charmides, Laches, Hippias 
Major, Euthydemus, Meno, Gorgias, Cratylus and Phaedo are free from any use of 
all three phrases of τι ́ μη ́ν, ἀλλα ̀ ... μη ́ν and γε μη ́ν, the number of their use in 
other dialogues are as follows: 
a) τίμη ́ν: Ly.(1), Par.(6), Phds.(11), Sph.(12), Tht.(13), Pol.(20), Phil.(26), Rep.(34), 
La.(48) 
b) ἀλλα ̀ ... μη ́ν: Tim. and Criti.(0), Tht. and Phdr.(1), Sym., Par., Phil., Sph. and La. 
(2), Pol.(3), Ly.(4), Rep.(11) 
c) γε μη ́ν: Ly.(0), Sym., Phds.,Tht. and Criti.(1), Rep.(2), Par. and Sph.(5), Tim.(6), 
Phil.(7), Pol.(8) and La.(24). 
These occurences are not sufficient toauthentizeone to say that Sym., Ly., 
Phds., Rep. and Tht.make a group earlier than Par., Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. And 
La. Suppose that we accecpt his explanation that Plato took τί μη ́ν from Dorians in 
Sicily, what about Tim. and Criti.? Furthermore, the suggested order for Par. later 
than Phds., Tht. and Rep.cannot be consistent with these evidences. 
                                                 
1
 Brandwood (1990, 249f.) distinguishes between 'earlier' stylistic development which was slow 
and gradual and a 'later' which was sudden and rapid happening when Plato was about sixty. 
2
 In doing this, I was benefited so much from Brandwood’s (1990 and 1992) tables and 
comparisons. Also cf. Dorter's table (1994, 7).  
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iii)Dittenberger’s calculation of καθα ́περ and its preference to ὣσπερ in some 
dialogues sounds conclusive because the use of this word in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. 
and La. (orderly: 27,14,34,18,148) is incomparable with its use in other dialogues 
like Sym., Phds., Rep. and Tht. (orderly: 2,4,5,2) and might be reasonably as its 
preferrence to ὣσπερ. What is confusing for Dittenberger is the case of Parmenides 
in which there is no use of the word. Besides the problem of Parmenides that, I think, 
is due to the orthodox belief about its lateness which is more based on a need for a 
consistent story than stylometric evidences, all that the use of καθα ́περ proves is 
that Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim. and La. are close to each other. This result is very close to 
the result of Campbell’s evidence, adding Phil.  
While the occurences of ἓως(περ) is seen in most of the dialogues, με ́χριπερ 
occurs only in Phil., Sph., Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. (orderly: 1,1,3,4,1,16) which 
approves the same result mentioned about καθα ́περ. Though ignored by 
Dittenberger, this result, with two exceptions of Criti. in which there is no occurance 
and Ap. where we have one occurance, is approved again by the number of 
occurances of τα ́χα ἴσως in Phil., Sph., Pol.,Tim. and La. (orderly: 3,2,3,1, 11). To 
sum up Dittenberger’s evidence, while I think μήν-phrases does not prove anything, 
the occurance of καθα ́περ, μέχριπερ and τα ́χα ἴσως indicates that Phil., Sph., 
Pol., Tim., Criti. and La. must be considered as close to each other. This result is 
almost the result of Campbell evidence by the only difference of addying Phil.. The 
surprising fact is that in spite of the abnormalities of Par., it is still considered by 
Dittenbergeramong the dialogues of the late group. 
iv) Schanz’ calculation of τῷ ὄντι, ὄντως, ὡς ἄληθῶς, α ̓ληθῶς, τῆ ̩ α ̓ληθείᾳ 
and ἀληθεία showed that: 
a) There is no occurance of τῷ ὄντι in Phil., Pol., Tim. and La. where the use of 
ὄντως is considerable (orderly: 15, 11, 8, 50). If we add Sph. and Epi.where there is 
only one occurance of τῷὄντι and a considerable number ofoccurances of ὄντως 
(Sph.(21), Epi.(16)), we will have six dialogues of Phil., Pol., Tim., La., Sph. and 
Epi. as dialogues which are close to each other in this regard.  
b) The case is a bit different with ὡς ἄληθῶς and ἀληθῶς. Besides Phil., Pol., 
Tim. and La., we have also H. Ma., Mene. and Meno as the dialogues where there is 
no occurances of the former. While the number of occurances of the latter in the first 
four dialogues (orderly: 7, 4, 3, 6) is more than all other dialogues (with at most 
twooccurences), save Sph. with six occurrences, the problem is that unlike those 
four, Sph. has also threeoccurances of ω̒ς ἄληθῶς. None of the phrases occurs in 
Epi.. The result of this comparison is, thus, like the previous one but with a less 
certain conclusion. 
c) The occurance of τῆ ̩ ἀληθείᾳ has no significance except its more occurances in 
Grg.(6) and the last books (VIII-X) of Rep.(9) besides its absence in Meno and 
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Phil.and some other early dialogues. The use of ἀληθεία in four dialogues of 
Phil.(1), Tim.(1), La.(3) and Epi.(1) (ignoring the 3 occurances in Pr.because of 
being quotation) can bring forth only a very slight approvement of the previous 
results. The final conclusion we can draw out of Schanz’ evidence, however, is that 
Phil., Pol., Tim., La. and somehow Sph. and Epi.are closer to each other than other 
dialogues. 
v) Ritter’s list of forty three linguistic features of the late dialogues, mostly including 
reply formula in order to find how many of them have occurred in each dialogue, got 
to this arrangement: La.(40), Phil. and Pol. (37), Sph. (35), Rep. (28), Tht. (25), 
Phds. (21), Par. (17), Epi. (12), Cra. and Ly. (8), Phd.(7), Lach. (5), Euthd., Pr. and 
Mene. (4), Sym., Ch., Grg., H.Ma. and Ion. (3), Ap., Criti. and Meno (2), and 
Euthp.(1) 
What this comparison is supposed to mean? How can we compare different 
dialogues on the basis of the number of reply formula used in them while not only 
are they different in their number of pages, but also in their being dialogical? Many 
dialogues like Sym. andPhds.as well as some books of Rep.do contain less questions 
and answers and thus less features and also many other considerations. The case is 
almost the same with Lutoslawski’s (1897) assessment using more than five hundred 
features. 
vi) Janell’s examination ofhiatus showed that the frequencey of objectionable hiatus 
in La. (with the average of 4.7 per page), Epi. (2.8), Tim. (1.2), Criti. (0.8), Sph. (0.6) 
and Pol. (0.4) is extraordinarily lower than all other dialogues, e.g., Ly. (46), Euthd. 
(45.1), Phd. (41), Meno (38.3), Rep. (35.3), Tht. (32) and Phds. (23.9). Besides the 
first obvious conclusion that those six dialogues are close to each other, it can also 
mean that these dialogues are the latest dialogues since it is not understandable that 
Plato, who avoided the objectionable hiatus in them has forgotten to avoid them in 
the dialogues later than them. Comparing with the other evidences, Janell’s evidence 
is more authentive in considering the late dialogues as late. 
vii) The investigation of the clausulae of Plato’s writing in Laws and comparing it 
with Pol., Phil., Tim. and Criti.on the one hand and Ap., Pr. and Cr. on the other 
hand in Kaluscha’s examination showed that the prose rhythm of La. is similar to 
that of the first group. This was another approvement of all past evidences of 
similarity between La. and late dialogues. 
I hope this brief evaluation of the stylometric evidences can clearly show that 
all that stylometric evidences can prove is that the dialogues Sophist, Politicus, 
Timaeus, Critias, Philebus, Laws and Epinomis must be close to each other and 
probably later than other dialogues. What stylometry at most can do
1
 for the 
arrangement of the dialogues is, therefore, only assuring us of a late group
2
that does 
                                                 
1
 That stylometric evidences are not sufficient to decide about chronology was noticed by many 
scholars. Cf.,e.g., Cooper, 1997, xii f.; Kahn, 1966, 44-5; Young, 1998, 39; Arieti, 1998, 274,  
2
 Cooper (1997, xiv) says: 'It is safe to recognize only the group of six late dialogues'  
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not include Parmenides and Theaetetus both stylometrically far from other dialogues 
of SCD’s late group. What stylometry cannot construct is a middle group since none 
of the stylometricevidences can prove such a group of dialogues. 'It is a fact often 
forgotten', Tarrant says, 'that the modern notion of a middle period in Plato’s work is 
an artificial construct that has no stylometric basis' (2000, 140). Stylometric 
evidences, on the other hand, are strongly against SCD’s consideration of 
Parmenides
1





























                                                 
1
 The anomalous style of the Parmenides was so unconceivable in SCD’s framework that made 








The standard chronology of dialogues that we tried to articulate in the previous 
section, is the subject of many objections most of which have been presented by the 
same scholars who accepted the framework of SCD in their own versions. Here we 
are going to discuss some of the main, mostly ontological and epistemological, 
problems of the standard chronology under three groups of objections. 
A. First group of objections: middle dialogues after early ones  
To consider the middle dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic 
immediately after the early dialogues has some epistemological and ontological 
problems. Our first group of objections, then, intends to show that there must be 
some problems with SCD’s tendency to put the middle dialogues immediately after 
the early ones.  
Objection I: Emergence of Good in epistemology 
What does happen there between the early and middle dialogues that the 
principle of 'knowledge of what X is' in the early dialogues becomes inferior to 
another principle, 'knowledge of Good'? This is an important difference between two 
groups of dialogues that SCD cannot explain. 
Objection II: The distinction of knowledge and true belief 
Contrasting to the early dialogues in which there is no serious hint to the distinction 
of knowledge and true belief, this distinction is strongly at work in the middle one as 
something already accepted or previously demonstrated. In the early dialogues, about 
every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and 
ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of 
knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. Socrates’ elenchus and his 
rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of 
the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The 
Socrates of the early dialogues never lets anyone partly know X or have a true 
opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not 
know what X is. We can obviously see in the middle period dialogues that the 
distinction of knowledge and true belief is at work as an already demonstrated 




A turning point between these two situations must be wherever true opinion is 
accepted as a distinct epistemological status from knowledge. Since the distinction of 
knowledge and opinion is an important result of Theaetetus’ long discussion about 
knowledge, it can be the best turning point. Socrates’ refusing of both the second 
suggestion that knowledge is true opinion (187bff.) and the third suggestion that 
knowledge is true opinion plus an account (201dff.) proves that knowledge and 
opinion must be considered as different things. Meno is another dialogue 
whichdiscusses the distinction, but it more takes it for granted than proving it and, 
therefore, it is obviously after making the distinction. When it is said at 85c-d that the 
slave boy has true opinion about the same hings he does not know, the distinction is 
presupposed. The interrelated theories presented about the distinction with the use of 
the myth of Daedalus (97d-e) and the theory of anamnesis (98a) also presuppose the 
distinction. Even at 98b Socrates surprisingly says that if he can claim to know 
anything, which about few things he does, he claims that knowledge and opinion are 
different. Hence, we cannot regard Meno as the turning point when we have 
Theaetetus in which the distinction is demonstrated. While Theaetetus looks as the 
epistemological turning point here, the problem is that based on SCD, it cannot be 
posited amongst the early and the middle dialogues. 
Objection III: Immediate shift from bipolar to tripartite ontology 
How can we get to the principle of tripartite Ontology from bipolar ontology 
while moving from the early dialogues to the Republic? Based on SCD we do not 
have such permission. I think this can be considered a crucial objection that makes it 
necessary to assume some dialogues between the early and the middle dialogues. 
Objection IV: Possibility of being of not being 
While the Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is 
predominant in the early dialogues (e.g., Euthydemus 284b3-5, Republic 476-477) 
speaks of that which both is and is not.  
The turning point must obviously be the acceptance of the being of not being. 
This occurs deficiently in the second part of Parmenides (hereafter: Parmenides II)
1
 
and sufficiently in Sophist. At Parmenides161e-162b the being of not being is 
discussed and at 163c it is said that not being is the absence of being. It is, however, 
denied there and also at 164b. In Sophist (257b) it is strictly said that not being is not 
contrary to, but different from, being and at 258b-c the peculiar character of not 
being and also the Form of not being are discussed (cf. 258d). After explicitly 
rejecting the principle of 'father Parmenides' (258d),  not being is connected, more 
obvious than before, with the notion of difference and introduced as each part of the 
nature of difference that is set over against being (258e). There is no contrary of 
                                                 
1
 By Parmenides II I mean the second part of Parmenides including the part from 137 to the end of 
the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is discussed. 
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being and, thus, not being cannot be its contrary. At 260b not being is considered as a 
Form that is scattered on being. The problem is that while ParmenidesII and Sophist 
look as the ontological turning points here, based on SCD we must regard them as 
post-Republic dialogues.  
 
B. Secondgroup of objections: Late period diaogues after middle ones 
This group of objections aims to show how problematic it is to locate some of 
the SCD’s late group of dialogues like Theaetetus, Sophist and Laws after dialogues 
like Meno, Phaedo and Republic. 
Objection V: Problems of the lateness of Theaetetus 
If we accept SCD’s arrangement for Theaetetus as a late or late middle 
dialogue after Meno and Repuclic, we cannot explain how Plato who had spoken 
before about belief as distinct from knowledge in Meno (85c-d, 97a-b, d-e, 98a-b) 
and had taken this distinction for granted in RepublicV (477e-478e), upon which he 
relies the ontological distinction between Forms and particulars (476c-d, 477e-
478e,479d), suddenly comes to the elementary state about the relation between 
knowledge and opinion in a later dialogue asking whether knowledge is distinct from 
opinion or not. How can we understand Theaetetus’ suggestion at 187b that 
knowledge is true opinion and Socrates’ all efforts to reject it and prove that 
knowledge is different from opinion as a later suggestion and effort?
1
 Although Fine 
brings three reasons to call the revealing of the discussion in Theaetetus 'surprising' 
(2003, 19-23), the problems of considering Theaetetus as a late dialogues are best 
discussed in Sedley’s list of six problems (1996, 84-5): 
1- While in Republic and Timaeus knowledge is distinguished by its objects, namely 
Forms, Theaetetus tries to treat with empirical objects and is far from observing 
Forms as the objects of knowledge. 
2- That the strong contrast between epistēmē and doxa in Republic and Timaeusgives 
way in Theaetetus to the theory that knowledge is a kind of poinion. Even the way 
that the earlier suggestion (without adding logos) is rejected, Robinson (1950, 4-5) 
claims, seems actually to deny Republic’s view. What is said at 201b as the reason of 
the rejection of their identity, namely that jurymen can achieve a true opinion about 
the facts that only an eyewitness could know about. This implies that we can know 
through our eyes while Republic strongly held that knowledge is only of the invisible 
Forms. He also points to 185e and 208d as other evidences of this. 
                                                 
1
 Rickless (2007, 245) thinks that it is 'of a shock' and 'of a puzzle' to see Theaetetus’sthree 
epistemic theories which, in his point of view, are all incompatible with two worlds theory. That 
Plato gives these theories at 'the time of day in the Theaetetus' and does not simply dismiss them 
is the cause of puzzle for him.  
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3- The theory of anamnesis that Plato had set out in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrusis 
never invoked
1
 in the Theaetetuseven when he theorizes different models for the 
acquisition of knowledge there. Sedley notes (p.85) that in the Aviary model, Plato 
has to accept that an infant’s mind is empty (197e) which is 'apparently in flat 
contradiction of the innateness doctrine' of anamnesis (cf. also: Robinson, 1950, 4. 
He calls it 'out of harmony' with the doctrine).Cornford (1935, 28) thinks that never 
abandoning the theory, Plato could not mention it there because it presupposes the 
answer to the question about knowledge.  
4- Appearance of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge in Theaetetus after the long 
activity of a constructive Socrates in the middle dialogues. 
5- Noting to the fact that Theaetetus fails in finding out what knowledge is, Sedley 
asks: 'can this really be the same Plato who in the Republic made knowledge the 
distinguishing mark par excellence of the philosopher?' (ibid) 




Sedley presents three interpretations as possible solutions of the problem.
3
 
According to the first interpretation, Theaetetus is silent about the middle-period 
doctrine.
4
 Whereas based on the second interpretation, unlike the epistemology of 
Republic and Timaeus which have Forms as their objects, Theaetetus does address 
only to the sensible world, the third interpretation tries to make the Meno the 
canonical text and interpret the Theaetetus accordingly (p. 93f.). The way Robinson 
(1950, 5-6) speaks about the problem ofTheaetetus is noteworthy: 
 
Is the inconspicuousness of the Forms in the Theaetetus due to Plato’s not 
having believed in them when he wrote it? The answer yes was easy to accept in 
the days before stylometry, when one could hold that the Theaetetus was an 
early dialogue, written before the theory of Forms was thought of and expressed 
in the Phaedo and the Republic. 
 
Neither holding a dialogue as earlier than Phaedo and Republic can allow us to 
say it belongs to the period that the theory of Forms has not ben thought; nor the 
                                                 
1
 Robinson (1950, 3-4) mentionsLéon Robin (1939) notes that the only one who was claiming the 
existence of some evidences of the theory in Theaetetus, appealing to, for instance, 185c-d, 
186b-c or 197e,  was whose references he calls 'certainly wrong'. Kahn (2006, 127) thinks that 
some 'echoes or analogues' to anamnesis can be recognized in Theaetetus though he accepts that 
it 'makes no use of' the theory (p. 129). 
2
 Tarrant thinks that Meno 'allegedly supplies the answer to the question posed by the Theaetetus' 
(2000, 37). 
3
 Wolfsdorf’s suggestion (2014, 161-162) that Theaetetus supersedes Meno because while the latter 
does not intend to consider the 'epistemological status of the aetiological account itself', the 
former criticizes 'decompositional and differential accounts on epistemological grounds', seems 
at least convincing.  
4
 Nicholas P. White (1976, 157-8), for example, thinks that the epistemological question of 
Theaetetus, namely that what knowledge is, had occupied Plato since the beginning of his 
carear, but it was only in 'muted form' in the middle dialogues. 
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stylometry, as we discussed, does say that its place after those dialogues is a more 
acceptable place. 
The substantial problem with Theaetetus’position as later than the middle 
dialogues, as the above-mentioned problems clearly show, is an epistemological one. 
While one might agree that from a modern point of view, it might be even more 
developed than the epistemology of Phaedo and Republic
1
 but can it be still the case 
from Plato’s point of view? The fact that Theaetetus was a fresh start, as Vlastos 
(1991, 77) calls it so,  after the Parmenides’ attacks against the theory of Forms, in 
which I am entirely in agreement with them, cannot justify SCD’s dating of it after 
middle period dialogues. Theaetetus can, however, be accepted as a fresh start after 
Parmenides but still prior to the Meno, Phaedo and Republic.
2
 
Objection VI: Problem of taking Sophist and Parmenides II as later than 
Republic  
 While SCD’s arrangement for Theaetetus was epistemologically problematic, 
the place it gives to Sophist makes ontological problems. In the earlier parts 
ofSophist we are still committed to the Parmenidean principle (237a) and cannot find 
that which not being can apply to (237b) because not being cannot be applied to 
those that are (237c). This is the ontological side of the problem of false belief that is 
being discussed in Sophist, a long discussion which finally brings about an important 
ontological turn, namely its going beyond Parmenidean principle (258d), accepting 
the being of not being and considering not being as different and thus not as 
something contrary to being (258ef.). How can we understand now Repulic’s 
admission of what both is and is not (476e-477a-b), which is obviously taken as 
something that has been proved before, prior to Sophist? The main reason based on 
which SCD is inclined to date Republic earlier than Sophist is that the stylistic 
features of Republic are far different from the so-called late dialogues to which 
Sophist is stylometrically so close. Before stylometry, it was almost a somehow 
agreed point that Sophistwould have been before Republic.  
The same objection is appliable, though not with the same strength, to the 
lateness of the second part of Parmenides where an incomplete version of solving the 
problem with the notion of 'difference' can clearly be seen (143b, cf.162d). 
Parmenides II is not as successful as Sophist in completing the solution and leads at 
the end to the absolute denial of the being of not being. 
                                                 
1
 I think it can be one of the reasons why the modern thinkers of 20
th
 century were more inclined to 
accept Theaetetus as a late dialogue. 
2
 SCD’s problem about the place of Cratylusis somehow related with its problem about Theaetetus 
(cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While Cratylus looks close to the early dialogues, it has some 
unignorable similarities to Theaetetus, which is considered by SCD far from the early and after 
the middle period dialogues. 
67 
 
Objection VII: Problem of Laws and Politicusafter Republic 
It might look strange, at first sight, to make this objection against SCD’s 
arrangement because it has always been admitted as the most evident that Laws must 
be set after Republic. Moreover, our only external evidences of the dialogues, the 
testimony of Aristotle (Politics II, 6) is in favor of this arrangement. The problem 
that Laws’ political theories are unacceptably neglecting, or unaware of, Republic’s 
philosopher-king and, as Sounders says, it is vanished in Laws 'without trace' (1992, 
465). About onto-epistemological issues, the differences between two dialogues are 
so huge that leads Saunders to believe that: 
 
It is very hard not to feel that one has entered a different world, in which the 
cutting edge of Plato’s political thought, metaphysics, has been lost. (ibid) 
 
Owen thinks that the Laws 'embodies no consistent reversion' (1998, 264) to 
the political theories which we face in Republic
1
. Although Laws is empty from the 
theory of philosopher-king, it has, however, some reference to other theories of 
Republic. The objection we brought forth is, then, the question that if 
RepublicantecedatesLaws, why Plato is neglecting the theory of philosopher-king in 
there? The only solution SCD can propose is that, as Owen for example says, Laws is 
'designed to modify and reconcile political theories which he had advanced at 
different times' (1998, 264). Those parts of Republic which are neglected in Laws, 
namely the theory of philosopher-king and Republic’s ontology are from the same 
books of Republic, from the latest pages of the book V to the end of book VII, where 
the being of what both is and is not is admitted (the subject of objection II). Politicus 
is also devoid of the theory of philosopher-king
2
 though it says that rulers must have 
ἀληθῶς ἐπιστήμονας (293c5-7). This seems to be a more elementary, and the 
prior step, of the theory of philosopher-king of Republic and not vice versa.  
C. Third group of objections: Parmenides 
As we tried to show in the first part above, the position of Parmenides in SCD 
is a determined position in relation with some dialogues. It is definitely dated (i) after 
Meno, Phaedo and Republic (II-X) and (ii) before Theaetetus, Sophist, Politicus, 
Philebus, Timaeus  and Critias. What our third group of objections is going to attack 
is only the first point that is SCD’s arrangement of Parmenides after middle period 
dialogues. These objections are more determinative than all other objections and are 
capable to prepare us for a new attitude towards Plato’s development and the 
chronology of his dialogues. 
                                                 
1
 Owen thinks that there is no evidence that any part of the Laws was written after every dialogue 
(1998, 277, n.76). 
2
 Barker considers Politicushostile to Republic but 'much less uncompromisingly hostile' as Laws is 
(1918, 314). Owen thinks that Barker’s paradox 'hardly needs refutation' (1998, 271). 
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Objection VIII:  Problems of considering Parmenides as referning to the middle 
period dialogues 
The biggest presumption of all Plato’s commentators is that Parmenides’ 
objections against the theory of Forms refer to the theory that had been formerly 
offered in some or even all (cf. Prior, 1985, 51) of the middle period dialogues. 
Cornford (1939, 70-71), for instance, points to this general agreement about Phaedo 
as the subject of Parmenides’ problems. Palmer emphasizes that what Socrates is 
advocating in Parmenides is 'a theory that in all essential respects is a version of 
Plato’s own middle period theory' (1999, 180). Meinwald, on the other side, 
criticizes the traditional consideration of Parmenides 135 as Plato’s comment 'on the 
status' of the middle period theory of Forms. The portrait Parmenides draws of the 
middle period theory, Meinwald asserts, is not containing a 'fully and adequetely 
developed theory of Forms' (1992, 372). The main problem, however, is that the 
middle period dialogues already contain the solutions of Parmenides’ problems. As 
Dorter says, Parmenides’ objections 'are easily answered on the basis of the features 
of the theory which were prominent in the middle dialogues' (1989, 200) and 'not 
only the answers but the problems themselves' were anticipated in those dialogues
1
 
(ibid). Gonzalez (2002b, 56-7) discusses several problems of the assumption that the 
critics are reffering to the middle period dialogues focusing on the multiplicity of the 
theory both in the middle dialogues and in Parmenides. 
Among those who take Parmenides’ objections valid, the general opinion 
about the relation of the theory of Forms in the middle period dialogues with 
Parmenides’ objections can be read in Kahn’s words (1996, 329): 
 
The classical doctrine of Forms, as developed in the Phaedo and Republic, is 
subjected to rigorous criticism by Plato himself in the Parmenides; and the 
objections raised against it there are never answered. 
 
We are not to claim thus that Plato answers directly to these objections in the 
middle period dialogues because such answers cannot be found anywhere in Plato’s 
corpus, neither in his middle nor in his late period dialogues. In fact, none of Plato’s 
dialogues directly discusses the issues of other dialogues. What we want to prove 
here is that the epistemological and ontological grounds of the theory of Forms as is 
represented in the middle period dialogues is deliberately constructed so as not to be 
broken by those criticisms anymore. We can find no answer to the objections 
because instead of providing answers to the problems, Plato changes, first, the 
epistemological and, then, the ontological grounds of the theory of Forms in order to 
be pretected from the objections. We suggest, thus, that not only Parmenidesʼ 
problems are not referred to the middle period dialogues but they areintentionally 
resolved there. Before discussing the problems and the way they are resolved in the 
middle period dialogues, let me point to some notes about Parmenides. 
                                                 
1
 Dorter claims that Plato recognized all these problems at the begining but did not felt that they 
could vitiate his theory (1989, 200). 
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1) Based on SCD’s arrangement, Plato who had introduced an old or at least adult 
Socrates presenting and, if we are allowed to say, defending his theory in all those 
well-done dialogues including Republic, suddenly and for the first and last time, 
makes this character very young to answer to the problems caused by the theories of 
Socrates 'in his maturity or even on his deathbed' (Dorter, 1994, 19). The character of 
a young Socrates, one might say, is only a dramatic necessity because if Plato wanted 
to make Socrates part of the conversation with Parmenides, it could hardly has 
happened otherwise. Even if we accept this dialogue’s actual occurance1, to speak 
about the dramatic necessity about the dialogues that have Socrates as their character, 
is far from the spirit of Sōkratikōi logoi genre. The youth of this charater, on the 
other hand, is not mentioned only dramatically at the first part of the dialogue or by a 
slight reference somewhere in the dialogue, but is used specifically and purposefully 
with too much emphasis. Both of the indications at 130e and 135c-d show that the 
dialogue wants to emphasize the fact that the theory of Forms under consideration 
has been offered by a young man who, though is intelligent and able to present noble 
and divine arguments (135d2-3), has not yet been gripped (ἀντείληπται) by 
philosophy or properly trained (135c8) as will be in the future (130e2).
2
 Having 
pointed to the possibility of attaching some kind of significance to Socratesʼ youth, 
Gosling asserts that 'it might be that we are being given a critique of either early 
arguments for the Forms, or arguments of neophytes' (1973, 192). 
2)Parmenides’ theory of Forms is a more elementary theory than that of Phaedo and 
Republic. Both the details of the theory and the way it is defended by Socrates, if we 
can call it defence, show that the theory is introduced as a not well-thought one. We 
are not to discuss the probable changes of the theory of Forms here. Either Plato tries 
to change the theory in its details or not, he changes the epistemological grounds of 
the theory in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus and the ontological grounds in 
Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus and Republic among the middle dialogues. These 
changes of the grounds are, as we will argue, because of the problems of the 
Parmenides. I categorize these problems first into six main problems:
3
 
1. Problem of Forms for all, even worthless, things (130c-d) 
2. Problems of participation (131) 
3. Problem of Third Man (132a-b) 
4. Problem of considering Forms as thoughts (132b-c) 
5. Problem of Forms as paradigms (132d) 
                                                 
1
 Guthrie (1975, 347) thinks that this dialogue must have happened about the year 450 B.C. Allen 
(1997, 72) dates it between 452 and 449 B.C., if ever happened. He notes (p.74), however, that 
the conversation reported in Parmenides is fiction.  
2
 Palmer notes that Parmenides’ young Socrates resembles the person described at Reublic VII 
534b3-4, someone who is 'unable to give an account of something, either to himself or to 
another', cannot be acceptable. 
3
 Though maybe notabout the names, the classification of the problems to these six problems is 
something almost agreed. Cf., e.g. Gill 2006 
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6. Epistemological problems of taking Forms as separated from particulars (133a-
135a) 
Let put aside the first problem. Maybe we cannot show that Plato in the middle 
dialogues did not consider Forms for all things, as we cannot show this in his other 
dialogues
1. Nonetheless, Aristotle’s criticism that from some of the proofs for the 
existence of the Forms, it follows that there must be Forms 'even of those things of 
which they think there are no Forms' (Metaphysics 1079a6-7) might be an evidence 
for the fact that either Plato or the Academy or both did not use to posit Forms for all 
things
2
. The fourth problem is also specific to the suggestion of Forms as thoughts 
and is not necessarily a problem related to Plato’s own theory of Forms3. There 
remain four problems. The third and the fifth problem has the same basis, namely the 
regress problem or the problem of Third Man. Since we think the Third Man 
difficulty arises from a certain relation between a Form and its participants, we will 
discuss the third and the fifth problems besides the second problem. We will 
therefore try to argue that i) the problem of participation and also the Third Man 
problem are not appliable to the theory suggested in Republic and thus the second, 
third and fifth problemsare resolved there; and ii) the epistemological problem 
cannot be applied to Meno, Phaedo and Republic as well as Phaedrus and, thus, the 
sixth problem is resolved in these dialogues. 
i) Problems of participation and Third Man in the Republic 
It has been taken for granted by a number of commentators that the Third Man 
problem (TM) as it is suggested in Parmenides and referred to repeatedly by 
Aristotle has Self Predication (SP) as its basis. If the Form of F is itself F, as all the 
participants of F are F, it will necessarily lead to TM. Based on this presumption, 
scholars made a direct and fixed relationship between SP and TM. On the contrary, 
what I will suggest is that though Plato accepts SP in all the periods of his 
philosophical life, it does not necessarily leads to TM in Republic while it can lead to 
it in the other dialogues of the middle period.  
                                                 
1
 What is said at Sophist 254c1-3, 'Let’s not talk about all Forms. That way we won’t be thrown off 
by dealing with too many of them. Instead, let’s choose some of the most important 
(μεγίστων) ones', might be observed as a try to avoid this problem.  
2
 Moreover, Aristotle points in several places that based on the arguments from the existence of 
sciences, there must be Forms at least for all things of which there are sciences (e.g. 
Metaphysics 990b12-14, 990b24-27, 1079a7-9) and thus even for non substances (cf.  990b22-
24, 1079a19-21) which might have the same echo. 
3
 Because of the date of Parmenides in SCD, Allen’s suggestion (1997, 167ff.) that the theory of 




That Plato accepts SP is agreed by many commentators like Vlastos
1
 (1954, 
388), Fine (2003, 36), F. C. White (1977) and Ryle (1939, 138) so far as Meinwald 
calls SP 'one of the most evident and characteristic features' (1992, 363) of Plato’s 
works. Vlastos says that Plato 'neither could convince himself that the Third Man 
Argument was valid, nor refute it convincingly' (1954, 342). Plato could not have 
thought of TM as valid because this is a problem that, as Vlastos says, destroys the 
'logical foundations' of all his theory (1954, 349). The case is different with Cherniss: 
not only TM is invalid and thus harmless to Plato’s theory but also Plato did know 
that it is invalid when he put it in Parmenides’ mouth (1998, 294).2 He thinks that 
Plato shows himself to be aware of TM in the Republic and Timaeus
3
 and he did not, 
undoubtedly, believe TM to be destructive (1944, 294-5) for if Plato considered TM 
fatal, he must have abandoned that theory at least as early as the Republic (1944, 
294). 
Allen argues that though, for Plato, the just itself is just and the beautiful itself 
beautiful, this does not imply SP because for this, the function "… is F" must be 
applied univocally to F itself and F particulars. This univocal application of F to F 
itself and F particulars, Allen says, can be correct only if both of them 'have 
identically the same character' (1998, 58) which obviously is not the case: 
 
To say that justice is just and that any given act is just would be to say two quite 
different (though perhaps related) things and the difficulties inherent in self-
perdiction could not possibly arise. That is, the character of Forms would not be 
assimilated to that of particulars. (ibid) 
 
While the function "… is F" for F itself is, in Allen’s point of view, 'identity' 
statement
4
, it is for F particular only a 'relational' statement (ibid, 59). He points that 
                                                 
1
 Although he lists Ly.217d, Pr. 330c-d and H. Ma.besides middle dialogues as places where SP is 
implied (1954, 388), he indicates that Plato never asserted it in his writing because if he ever 
did, Aristotole would have known it (1954, 339). 
2
 What Cherniss says about the difference of being ζῷον in a Form and its participants in the 
Republic and Timaeus is noteworthy: 'In the language of the Republic they would have the idea 
but would not be ὃ ἔστι ζῷον' (1944, 296). He also refers to Timaeus 39e and 30c5-8 where 
the difference between having ζῷον and being ζῷον is persisted upon. 
3
 Owen (1998, 255) strongly disagrees with Cherniss on this point. Conford thinks that Plato’s 
statement at Republic 597c that the divine creator made only one 'Bed' might refute TM because 
'the Form and the individual beds are not entities of the same order and alike. The Form, Bed, is 
not a bed; and it is not true that it has the character in the same way that individual beds have it' 
(1939, 90). By comparing Republic 597c with Timaeus 31a, Cornford concludes, as we said 
about Cherniss, that Plato could not be blind that Parmenides’ assumption that Largeness is a 
large thing is fatal (ibid). Cherniss names Taylor as the only one who denied that the passage in 
Timaeus (31a) could be a reference to the "regress argument" (1944, 295-6). 
4
 Allen argues that to say that F-ness is F is nothing but saying an identity statement. He cocludes 
that 'Plato’s apparently self-predictive language' does not result in SP (1998, 59). His reason is 
that, firstly, to say "F-ness is F" is not a predicative statement and, secondly, "… is F" function 
does not mean the same about the Form and its particulars. 
72 
 
for Plato, both in the early and middle dialogues, Forms are paradigms or standards, 
that is they are 'things characterized not characters' (ibid, 64) and Plato did not 
thought of them as common characters.
1
 It is, therefore, based on his rejection of 
univocal predication of F on F itself and F particulars that Allen rejects TM (1998, 
68). He correctly points that the fundamental difficulty underlying TM is ontological 
instead of linguistic. 'Not only the regress arguments', he says, 'but all of the 
objections to participation in the Parmenidesposit an identity of character between 
Forms and particulars' (ibid). The rejection of the identily of F in F itself and F 
particulars based on the theory of Forms as paradigms in the original-copy model is 
justified because Forms stand to particulars 'not as predicates stand to instances of 
predicates but as originals stand to shadows or reflections' (1961, 333 cf. 335). 
We have then two related points: that (1) TM arises from taking the F of the 
Form and that of its particulars identical; and (2) in the original-copy theory of 
Forms they are not identical and, therefore, TM cannot be appled to it. F. C. White 
rejects the second point and thinks that the original-copy theory cannot be helpful in 
meeting TM
2
 (1977, 208). His reason is that if images are images at all, it is due to 
the fact that their properties are 'univocally in common with their originals' (ibid, 
cf.199). He points that appealing to the model of original-copy cannot be helpful to 
avoid SP
3
 while there are some 'independent reasons' that Plato was committed to it 
(ibid, p.211). White points to Phaedo and Republic where he thinks (1) the relation 
between Forms and particulars is not described as similar to the relation between 
originals and shadows, and (2) particulars are not seen as totally dependent on Forms 
or 'pure reflections' (1977, 211-212). He thoroughly, and I think appropriately, 
rejects any common theory in the middle dialogues concerning the nature of Forms 
and particulars or the relation between them (ibid). Sedley (2006) shows that even in 
Phaedo, the resemblance and 'striving to be like' is never crucial in Plato’s 
relationship between Forms and particulars. He notes (311) that even if we accept 
this as the correct relationship in Phaedo, it cannot be considered as an integral 
component of Plato’s philosophy. 
My own point of view is that while TM is not appliable to Republic, it is 
appliable to all the other middle dialogues. I agree with White that i) there is no 
common theory in the middle dialogues about the nature of the relation between the 
Forms and their participants; ii) the original-copy model is not appliable to Phaedo
4
; 
                                                 
1
 Thinking that there is a 'partial or relative' identification of universals and paradigms, Gerson 
(1998, 138) criticizes their complete distinction.  
2
 White believes that it is not plausible to suppose that Plato who was aware of the implications of 
the original-copy theory of predication for the TM problem, hesitated to spell out its relevances 
(1977, 208). White’s suggestion, I think, cannot be admitted about a philosopher like Plato who 
even did not speak about his main theory, i.e. theory of Forms, as a theory. 
3
 He also rejects the suggestion that Plato’s notion of primary and secondary derivative designates 
of Forms in Phaedo could entail that the Forms are not subjects of SP (1977, 208-9). 
4
 Allen (1997, 106) mentions Phaedo 74b-75d as an evidence for the theory of paradigm in this 
dialogue. About Republic Von which White insists, I am not convinced since I think there are 
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iii) the original-copy model cannot be helpful regarding SP. Nonetheless, I absolutely 
disagree with him about its help to TM. What I think is that while Plato has always 
been committed to SP, he tried in Republic to present the original-copy model, which 
is completely helpful against TM. Plato does not try to reject TM by rejecting SP as 
some think, but he tries to reject TM while maintaining SP. Because of the difference 
between original and its shadow, the originel-copy model of the theory of Forms, as 
Allen noted, escapes TM. The reason is that by this theory, the nature of participation 
changes in aaway that the identity of a Form and its participants is not the case 
anymore.
1
 We are not being said here of a character which is present in a Form and 
its participants but of a character which originally and really belongs to the Form but 
is applied in a different way and thus not univocally to its copy. Based on Plato’s 
ontology in Sophist, Timaeus and Republic, it is only a man who is really and 
originally a man and if we call his reflection in a mirror or his shadow a man and say 
"it is a man", we do not use this 'is' univocally. This ontology, amnongst so called 
middle dialogues I confine to Republic, changes the nature of participation so that 
neither Parmenides’ problem of participation nor TM will be appliable anymore. Not 
only does not it reject SP butit even strengthen it. It is primarily and completely the 
Form of F which is F; a participant’s being F must be understood in a different way. 
White’s objections that participants are not totally dependent or 'pure reflections', is 
not the case about this ontology. Whether we consider them so or not, this ontology 
can work for it does not necessarily say that particulars are 'pure reflections'. All that 
is being said here is that a Form and its participant are the same thing (F) but in 
different ways. Although Plato’s use of mimesis instead of metexis in Republiccan 
correctly be interpreted based on this new ontology, I do not intend to take it so 
because to rely on Plato’s use of different words is neither possible nor convincing.2 
A paradigm of F is the perfect example of being F
3
. The paradigm of F is not 
F-ness but F itself. The difference between F-ness and F itself can become evident if 
we examin SP about them: While SP is correct and meaningful about F itself, it looks 
bizaare and unacceptable about F-ness. Large itself, the paradigm of Large, its 
perfect example, is obviously large because it is nothing but this being large and thus 
SP is obviously meaningful here. But about F-ness: 'Largeness is large' or 'beauty is 
                                                                                                                                          
not enough about the case in this book that approves White’s suggestion. White brings the use 
of μετέχειν or κοινωνία or the use of πράγματα and μετέχοντα as evidence (1977, 201-2) 
which, I think, prove nothing.   
1
 We know that Aristotle (Metaphysics 991a20-22) does not accept such a change and takes it only 
as poetical metaphors that change nothing. 
2
 Gosling (1962, 27-8) warns out the danger of such relying on terminology and passing from the 
similarity of terminology to the similarity of problems. 
3
 Bluck’s point about Parmenides is worth noting:  
Plato means us to infer from the Parmenides that the positing of a further Form is 
not necessary. All that is necessary is that there should be one Form to be the 
'standard' even if we happen to be treating that Form as (qua an X) a member of the 
group of X things. (1957, 124) 
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beautiful' looks completely unacceptable because F-ness or the concept of F cannot 
itself be F. TM is also based on the assumption that Plato’s theory of Forms makes a 
Form necessary when there is a common thing between some things. It is only by 
understanding the Form of F as F-ness, a universal concept which is in common 
between a Form and its participants that the necessity of the existence of what is 
common between them is followed. If Forms are not universal concepts but originals 
of which all participants are shadows, there will be no necessity for a third thing to 
represent the common feature. Therefore, Plato’s original-copy model of his theory 
of Forms changes the relation between a Form and its participants in a way that none 
of the problems of participation and regress arguments of Parmenides can be 
effective anymore. The case is different about Phaedo because the original-copy 
model and the theory of Forms as paradigms are not yet theorized there.
1
 
(ii) The Epistemological Problem 
Besides the distinction of knowledge and true belief that can clearly be helpful 
for the epistemological problem, Plato’s three famous doctrines, the theory of 
anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as causes, as I hope to 
show, do substantially aim at solving the epistemological problem resulted from the 
chorismos between the Forms and their particulars.
2
 
a) The theory of anamnesis in Meno, where it was introduced for the first time, does 
obviously intend to solve Meno’s paradox, the problem of knowing what one knows 
or does not know. It is Meno’s question, 'How will you search that thing when you 
do not know at all (ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν) what it is? (80d5-6), that is 
formulated by Socrates as the paradoxical problem of searching either what one 
knows or does not know (80e2-3). After leading to the theory of anamnesis at 81bff, 
it resolvesMeno’s problem by the theory that 'the whole of searching and learning is 
indeed anamnesis' (81d4-5).  
 The first appearance of the theory is not about Forms but about all the things 
of both this world and the underworld (81c5-7) and leads to the result that there is 
nothing that the soul has not learned (c7). It is Phaedo, however, where this 
epistemologic function of the theory is straightly directed to the Forms. Allen’s view 
                                                 
1
 Annas mentions Phaedo 74e (besides Republic, Euthyphro and Theaetetus (176e ?)) as one of the 
places in which Forms are considered as paradigms (1974, 278, n.50). Although it might be 
close to paradigm-based understanding of Forms, I am not certain about taking it so. That Form 
is something that participants want to be like (βούλεται ... εἶναι οἷον) but fall short, cannot 
necessarily mean that the Form is a paradigm here. Though the relation of Forms and 
participants in Phaedomight be directed towards what it will be in Republic, I do not think that 
we are allowed to assume them the same. About the mention of paradigm in Euthyphro 6e the 
best suggestion is, I think, that it is not, as Fujisawa (1974, 43) says, 'a case of genuine 
paradigmatism we find in later dialogues'.  
2
 Listing the anamnesis in Meno, the method of hypothesis in Phaedo and the non hypothetical 
principle in Republic as three answers to the question of the knowledge of the Forms, Sayre 
reasonably thinks that the first one is the simplest. (2005, 299) 
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in linking between the theory of anamnesis and the 'epistemological problem entailed 
by the separation of Forms and particulars' worths noting. He thinks that if the theory 
is an answer to this epistemological problem, it is not reasonable to say that the 
theory in Menois not directed to the problem.
1
 I admit Allen’s note that the difference 
of the theory of anamnesis in the Meno and Phaedo is that the theory in the Phaedo 
solves problems generated by a χωρισμός between Forms and particulars which 
Plato, when he wrote the Meno, was perhaps groping for, but had not yet clearly 
formulated (1959, 174.  
After distinguishing the equal itself (ἡ ἰσότης) from equal things (ἀυτα τα 
ἴσα) in Phaedo (74c1-2), Socrates says that deriving (ἐννενόηκάς) and grasping 
(εἴληφας) the knowledge of the equal itself from the equal things is anamnesis 
(74c6-d2). The prior knowledge of the Forms does obviously intend to solve the 
problem of knowing separated Forms.
2
This theory, hence, can help us to bridge from 
the particular things to what is distinct and separated from them because 1) we 
understand that the particular things wants to be like (βουλεται ... εἶναι οἶον) the 
Forms but fall short and cannot be like them and 2) we have prior knowledge 
(προειδότα) of the Forms (74d9-e4). These two points are essential parts of the 
theory of anamnesis by which Socrates tries to solve the problem of getting 
knowledge of the Forms from the particulars and knowledge of the particulars from 
the Forms. He continues:  
 
Necesserily, then, we must know in advance (προειδέναι) the equal (τὸ ἴσον) 
before that time we first saw the equal things and realized that all these objects 
strive to be like the equal but are deficient in this. (74e9-75a2)  
 
By this theory, our knowledge is not restricted to our own world anymore and 
it cannot be said, as is claimed at Parmenides 134a-b, that none of the Forms are 
known by us and thus the knowledge of Forms is not a problem any longer. They are 
not still in us and, therefore, do not have their being in relation to the things that 
belong to our world strictly as it is said at Parmenides 133c-d. Consequently, the 
theory of anamnesis suggests a solution to the problem of knowledge of Forms while 
keeping them separated. The gap between Forms and things is as complete and huge 
as it is in Parmenides 133e. Here they are even more separated than ever.
3
 
                                                 
1
 'It would appear to be a highly unlikely view of Plato’s development to hold that he accepted an 
answer, and only later found a question to fit it' (1959,172). 
2
 Allen (1959, 168) calls the filling of the gap the 'core' of Phaedo’s argument for the theory of 
anamnesis at 74b ff. (1959, 168). 
3
 It is the big presupposition of many Plato’s commentators that he must have tried to diminish or 
eliminate the chōrismōs had he wanted to resolve the epistemological problem of Parmenides. 
Based on this presumption, Plato should have chosen the first and most simple way of solving 
problem. So we can see while the theory of anamnesis is so much obviously directed to the 
epistemological problem, no one tends to take it as postParmenides thesis.  
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Phaedrus’elaborate story of the companion of the soul with Gods through the world 
of truths that is indeed the story of the process of anamnesis, evidently proves the 
function of the theory in respect of knowledge of the Forms (133e-135a). Only those 
souls who have seen the truth in the upper world, Socrates says, can take a human 
shape because human beings must understand speech in terms of general Forms 
proceeding from many alike perceptions to a reasoned unity (249b5-c2). 
b) As the doctrine of anamnesisis presented as a solution to Meno’s problem, the 
method of hypothesis is suggested as another solution to the problem: 
 
It seems we must inquire into the qualities of something the nature of which we 
do not yet know (ἔοικε οὖν σκεπτέον εἶναι ποι ̑όν τί ἐστιν ὂ μήπω ἴσμεν 
ὃτι ἐστίν). However, please relax your rule a little bit for me and agree to 
investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of hypothesis (ἐξ 
υ̒ποθέσεως); I mean the way geomters often carry on their investigations. 
(86d8-e5) 
 
After an example of how geometers make use of the method in their 
investigations (87a-b), Socrates continues: 
 
Since we do not know either what it is (ου ̓κ ἴσμεν οὔθ’ ὃτι ἐστὶν) or what 
qualities it pοsses, let us investigate it by means of a hypothesis whether it is 
teachable or not. (87b3-4) 
 
The relation of the method with Meno’s paradox in the mentioned passages is 
obvious enough. Phaedo’s more complicated and better-constructed method which is 
not simply applying geometrians’ method as it was in Meno, but a more 
philosophical and specified one, is still related with the problem of investigating 
something that is out of the region of our knowledge. Socrates’ warning about the 
danger of watching directly an eclipse of the sun (99d-e) before discussing the 
method (100a f.) can throw light on this relation. Socrates who is searching for the 
causes is afraid of his soul completely being blind if he looks at things directly as 
someone who watches an eclipse of the sun might become blind in his eyes. As the 
one who wants to watch the eclipse must first see its reflection in water and similar 
things, Socrates who wants to find the aitiai, i. e. Forms, must use the hypotheses. 
Therefore, the method of hypothesis is to be, firstly, a method of getting the 
knowledge of the Forms (100a6). Immediately after the definition of the method at 
100a, its relation with Forms becomes apparent at 100b f.  
The use of the method in the allegory of Line in Republicis also related with 
the Forms, though, contrary to Meno and Phaedo, it has nothing to do with 
anamnesis. While this method is not used in the dialectical proceeding from images 
to sensible things and then to the mathematical objects, the hypotheses are needed to 
proceed from them to the Forms and then to the first principle. Socrates’ reference to 
the method of geometers saying 'they make these their hypotheses and do not think it 
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necessary to give any account of them, either to themselves or to others, as if they 
were clear to everyone' (510c6-d1), indicates his intention, i.e. using Forms in an 
epistemological construction which, though has khowledge as its result, is not forced 
to explain Forms themselves. This is strictly directed against the epistemological 
problems arisen in Parmenides 134a-c.
1
 
c) Phaedo’s theory of Forms as causes has clearly the epistemologic function of the 
Forms as its purpose. Forms are the only things that can be the aitiai of things 
(101c2-6) but the problem is that to take Forms as explanation may be misleading 
because one thing can share in opposite Forms (102b3-6).  Referring to the Forms, 
therefore, cannot necessarily result in the explanation of things because everything 
can share many Forms and it cannot be meaningful to say something is so and so 
because it shares a Form and it is such and such because it shares another Form, the 
opposite to the first one. Things might happen to have (τυγχάνειἔχειν) some 
characters that are not due to their own nature (102c1-4). It is only tallness that has 
tallness as its nature as it is only shortness that has shortness as its nature (102d6-8). 
The opposites themselves (and not what have them by accidence) cannot accept each 
other while they are themselves. This gets to a crucial point: only what that shares in 
a Form by its nature, refuses its opposite while it is itself. It means we can explain a 
thing by not only a Form but also what always has its character (103e2-5). 
Everything that shares in a Form by nature is always called with that Form and can 
never be called by the opposite: It cannot 'admit that Form which is opposite to that 
which it is' (104b9-10). This helps him to reach to some kind of necessary opposition 
between things that are not the opposites (105a6-b1) which enables him to extend his 
previous safe and foolish theory of explanation by Forms to  anotheranother not 
foolish but still safe theory of explanation (105b6-c6). Socrates’ effort to show how 
Forms, without themselves being the explanation, can help us to reach to a safe 
explanation of things is against Parmenides’ problem (133c-134a) that Forms cannot 
help to the knowledge of particulars. 
Objection IX: Problem of considering Parmenides’ objections as invalid 
Parmenides’ objections against the theory of Forms can be considered either as 
serious and fatal or as invalid.
2
Let us see the problem of the latter first. Based on this 
                                                 
1
 Rickless’ opposite viewpoint about the theory of hypothesis seems to me an oversimplified view. 
He thinks that the method of hypothesis in the middle period is 'perhaps' because of Plato’s all 
negative method in the early period dialogues and Plato wants to 'repair' this defect of those 
dialogues (2007, 11). 
2
 Believing that the disjunction 'valid or invalid' is unsatisfactory in its consequences, Allen (1997, 
108) thinks that the criticism are put as aporiai which 'must be faced and thought through if 
philosophy is to be pursued'. He mentions Parmenides 129e, 130b, c and 135e as evidence 
where the criticisms are referred as aporiai and not as refutations. I actually agree that they must 
be taken as aporiai but I think that aporiai in any sense of the term in Plato and even Aristotle, 
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alternative, while Plato might have been aware of the fact that his theory had some 
problems, all or the majority of Parmenides’ problems were fallacious and thus 
unable to damage the theory. As, for example, Cornford says, 'it is naïve to conclude 
that Plato himself regarded the objections as seriously damaging his theory' (1939, 
95). Referring to Republic 596a, 597c and Timaeus 31a, he asserts that since both of 
the dialogues are later than Parmenides and the Forms are posited in both of them, 
Plato undoubtedly did not believe TM as destructive of his theory (1944, 294-5). 
Referring repeatedly to Philebus 15b-c as restatement of the dilemma of participation 
in Parmenides, Allen concludes that at least one of the criticisms is not to be 
regarded as valid (1997, 106).
1
 
Thinking that though the arguments raise serious problems, they are not fatal 
(1989, 184), Dorter brings some reasons for his opinion (ibid, 199-200). As Dorter 
himself objects, if Plato did not consider the arguments fatal, why did he change his 
way of treating with the theory and even put aside his favorite personage, Socrates, 
in the dialogues which, based on SCD, immediately follow Parmenides, namely 
Theaetetus, Sophist, and Politicus? In these dialogues, as Dorter points out, Plato 
seems to be 'exploring alternatives' for his theory (ibid). Robinson (1950, 5) notes 
that the general empiricist and even subjective atmosphere of Theaetetus’ tone in the 
absence of the religious tone to which we have been accustomed in the middle period 
dialogues, is 'unfavorable' to the theory of Forms. Cornford (1935, 28) believes that 
'Forms are excluded in order that we may see how we can get on without them… 
[that] without them there is no knowledge'. 
Moreover, not taking the problems as valid, Plato’s odd way of speaking about 
the friends of the Forms at Sophist 246b-d f. cannot easily be understood. Most 
importantly, if the problems were not valid, what on the world Plato meant by them? 
If they are to be considered as invalid, why should Plato choose Parmenides, the 
most respected figure to present it? Why at Theaetetus 183e and Sophist 217d, as 
Allen notes (1997, 107),he is praised for the noble depth he displayed and the 
magnificence of the arguments he employed on the occasion? 
Objection X: Problems of taking Parmenides’ objections as valid 
There are, on the other hand, some commentators like Ryle (1939, 129-130) 
who think that the arguments of Parmenides against the theory of Forms must be 
taken as serious and valid. Based on this view, Plato who might have been aware of 
the difficulties from the beginning manifested these problems in Parmenides and 
changed his direction from the middle period dialogues, which were based on the 
theory of Forms to the late period dialogues Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus, 
                                                                                                                                          
as is used in the Book Beta of his Metaphysics, are serious problems that must be resolved and, 
thus, will be fatal if not solved. 
1
 This can be tenable only if we observe no difference between the situation of the two dialogues as 
SCD maintains. A problem can be fatal in one and resolvable in another dialogue if they do not 
belong to the same period and, thus, there be the possibility of a later resolution. 
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obviously far from the previous predominance of the theory. This interpretation does 
not necessarily imply that Parmenides’ objections are correct objections, but that 
Plato took all or some of them as valid and thus became somehow disappointed with 
his theory of Forms as the dialogues after Parmenides show. If we agree with this 
interpretation and accept its general conclusion, as Runciman (1959, 151) does, the 
following problems will rise. 
1. The first problem is that the theory of Forms is seen, as Dorter notes, 'still intact' 
(1989, 183) in some of the later dialogues like Timaeus and Philebus which in SCD 
are generally taken as post-Parmenides dialogues. Burnet (1928, 44) claims that 
except 'in a single sentence of the Timaeus', 'there is noother words about the "forms" 
in any dialogue of later date than the Parmenides'. Reminding that the text in 
Timaeus (51c) is 'a long and emphatic paragraph' instead of a sentence, Cherniss 
(1962, 5) asserts that even this single text would be an exception 'important enough' 
to invalidate the general negation of the theory after Parmenides. He also points to 
Laws, Philebus
1
 and two of the Epistels where the theory appears.    
If Plato did revise his theory of Forms, how could he restate the theory in the 
dialogues after Parmenides? Timaeus and Philebuscannot consistently be dated after 
Parmenides if we regard the objections valid.
2
 I think this was one of the main 
reasons for Owen who tried to change what Cherniss later called an opinion 'as old as 
Plutarch' (1998, 273) namely the opinion that Timaeus was one of Plato’s latest 
works. Owen thinks that Parmenides must be read 'as following and not as paving 
the way for the Timaeus' (1998, 251). 
Though I might agree up to a point
3
 with Owen that 1) Timaeus must be 
regarded as the 'crowning work not of the later dialogues but of the Republic group' 
(1998, 253); 2) it represents the culmination of a period of growing confidence (ibid, 
266); and hence 3) must be posited at the end of the Republic group, I am not to 
accompany him in his final conclusion that Timaeus antecedates Parmenides. What 
Owen’s survey shows is, most of all, that SCD’s arrangement is problematic about 
the position of Parmenides in between two groups of the middle period and the late 
period dialogues. It implies the fact that we cannot put Parmenides 
unproblematically between Republic and Timaeus. 
2. The second problem with considering Parmenides’ arguments valid is that 
Aristotole (and even the Academy) read Plato as if he has not criticized his own 
                                                 
1
 Dorter (1994, 4) mentions 15b, 58a, 61d-62a, 64a as passages in Philebus that 'recapitulate ealier 
dialogues’ assertions about the theory of forms'. 
2
 One might say that what is said in our last section namely that Parmenides’ objections are 
resolved in the middle period dialogues must be applicable to Timaeus and Philebus. Though 
this is not wrong to say that the problems are already resolved in these dialogues, the difficulty 
is that they do not have anything to do with the solutions. Neither the original-copy model nor 
theories like anamnesis, hypothesis and the distinction of knowledge and true belief are initiated 
in and belong to them. 
3
 I say 'to a point' because the place Owen considers for Timaeus I give to Republic but I think, 
however, that Owen is right in that Timaeus is more similar to Republic. 
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theory of Forms. That Aristotle’s first years in Academy must have been passed as a 
faithful adherent of the theory of Forms or, as Cornford says, under 'overwhelming 
influence of his master' (1939, 109) is something we can be sure about.
1
His 
numerous critiques of the theory in his works
2
, some of which were not directed only 
against Plato but to the Academy also, shows, on the other hand, that there is some 
problem with dating Parmenides as later than Republic and still taking its critiques 
valid. If we accept the general opinion about the date of Aristotle’s joining, i.e., 366 
or 367
3
, we should agree that at least untill some years in which Aristotle became 
able to write his first works, Plato and Academy were still supporting the theory. 
Based on SCD, Plato must have published Parmenides before Aristotle’s joining or 
at least before his first writings.
4
 The problem is that we cannot admit that 
Parmenides’ arguments were written as valid arguments in these years that must 
reasonably be considered as Plato’s faithful years to the theory. 
The emergence of Plato’s theories in Aristotle has always been a matter of 
confusion. Just as some of the doctrines Aristotle ascribes to Plato cannot be found in 
Plato’s works (e.g., the relation of Forms and numbers or the theory of great and 
small), Aristotle’s way of criticizing the theory of Forms is such that it seems none of 
the difficulties were mentioned by Plato himself, while some of Aristotle’s 
objections are drawn out in Parmenides.
5
 Not only does Aristotle neglect 
Parmenides neither mentioning nor referring to Palto’s self-criticism, but he does not 




                                                 
1
 Though the sustained fragments from Eudemus and Protrepticus approve Plato’s influence on 
Aristotle, they have no sign of Aristotle’s approval of the theory of Forms having nothing 
against it too (cf. De Vogel, 1965, 261-298; Lloyd, 1968, 28-41). These works could not, 
however, belong to Aristotle’s first years in Academy though not impossible to belong to the 
period before Plato’s death. 
2
 The places where Aristotle criticized Plato’s theory of Forms are too numerous to be mentioned 
here. A brief list of Aristotle’s main objections only in Metaphysics includes: A: 988a1-7, 
990b9-991b8, 992a24-b9, 992b18-993a11, Z: 1031a28-b21, 1033b20-1034a8, 1039a24-b6, 
1039b17-19, 1040a8-27, I: 1059a17-b14, K: 1059b14-1060a2, Λ: 1070a9-30, 1071b22-1072a4, 
1075b28-1076a32, Μ: 1079a6-b23, 1079b3-1080a12, 1087a28-b3, N: 1090b4-32. 
3
 This date is the best consistent date with the famous story that Aristotle was Plato’s pupil for 20 
years. The Academy must then have been founded before 367. Ryle (1966, 8) thinks that its date 
must be before 369 when Theaetetus, one of its teachers, perished.  
4
 Kahn (1996, 81) thinks that it 'probably' must have 'recently' been completed before Aristotle 
arrived. In his suggestion, amongst the dialogues that have Socrates as their main speaker, only 
the Philebus was composed after his arrival. (ibid) 
5
Some of the resemblances are not deniable: e.g., the problem of Third Man at Par. 132a-b and at 
Met. 990b15-17, 991a1-8, the problem of complete distinction of knowledge of Forms with that 
of sensible things at Par. 134c and Met. 991a9-19, the problem of third pattern at Par. 132d 
with the problem of several patterns at Met.991a26-29, 1079b33-1080a2.Cherniss (1944, 9) 








There are many determinative factors regarding the chronology of the 
dialogues about which our informationis terribly deficient. There is no certain 
evidence about the date of each of the dialogues, nor any reliable information about 
the beginning and ending time of Plato’s writing. The most determinative issue 
among all chronological matters, I am inclined to insist, is the question that if did 
Plato use to manipulate or, as Dionysius of Halicarnassus said (1808, 406), polish, 
comb and curl his previously written dialogues and, if so, to what extent?
1
That there 
is almost no answer to this most crucial issue shows how far deficient, indefinite and 
inconclusive the chronological plans can be.
2
 The fact that we do not even have 
enough information to decide, in case of Socratic dialogues, to what extent they are 
reporting or reflecting the actual dialogues of historical Socrates, and to what extent 
they are Plato-made stories so that even now we have a schizophrenic character 
between Socrates and Plato, can be good evidence for this deficiency. There are, 
nevertheless, somemore certain informations that can be contributive in case of the 
arrangement of some dialogues. 
a) The only external evidence provided by Aristotle that Lawswas written after 
Republic (Politics, II, 6) which was repeated by others
3
. 
b) Few internal evidences provided by references in dialogues themselves including: 
i) the cross references in the Sophist 217a and Politicus 257a and 258b which 
indicate the prior composition of Sophist; ii) Timaeus 27 which hints to Critias as its 
sequel; iii) Theaetetus 183e where Socrates says he met Parmenides when he was 
young which has been taken as a reference to Parmenides; iv) a similar reference to 
the discussion of young Socrates with Parmenides this time in Sophist 217c; v) 
Sophist 216a refers to a previous discussion which has been thought to be referring to 
Theaetetus, and vi) the Timaeus 17b-19b in which Socrates tries to summarize his 
previous dialogue about the structure of cities, and the kind of men these cities must 
                                                 
1
Thesleff says that in spite of the fact that the only evidence from which we can infer the 
chronology is the internal evidence, 'the value of such evidence is open to the general 
criticism that many, if not all, may have been re-written' (1989, 7). 'There is no reason', he 
continues, 'to suppose that Plato left his writing in exactly the same state in which they 
were first composed'. (ibid) 
2There are some issues about Plato’s life that can overally change any chronological order. 
What Grombie calls 'the most critical event' (1969, 363) in Plato’s life, namely his 
probable being prosecuted for defamation and being forbidden to teach at 372 can be one 
of these issues.  
3
E.g.DiognesLaertius (Lives, III, 37), Olympiodorus (Prol. VI, 24) 
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bring up to become the best people and so on which, among the dialogues we have 
now, must refer to Republic. 
1. An onto-epistemological chronology of plato’s Dialogues 
 These few internal and external references are not of course sufficient to offer 
an arrangement among more than thirty dialogues. In such a poor situationabout 
information and the possibility of later manipulation of the dialogues, it seems the 
best criteria of presenting a chronology, if it can be possible at all, should be those 
which are the most fundamental on the basis that what is more fundamental must be 
the subject of change at last.Now, what kind of criteria can be chosen for an 
arrangement better than the ontology and the epistemology of the dialogues?  
Since the arrangement I am going to suggest here is to be based on the onto-
epistemological status of the dialogues,I shall call itthe Onto-Epistemological 
Chronology of the Dialogues (OECD). Although it is, of course, more of a 
philosophical chronology than a style-based one, while trying not to violate both the 
referential and stylometric evidences, it does not focus on other features of the 
content of the dialogues. In fact, the arrangement that is suggested here comes closer, 
I believe, to the evidences. Nonetheless, it is still a revolutionary chronology, not 
only in its main differences with other chronologies in respect of the place of some 
key dialogues, but also in its formulation of the whole corpus. Whereas I am not to 
divide the dialogues into different periods as all the various chronologies are used to 
do, I classify them in different groups I call "waves"; a name I borrowed from Plato 
himself. When he gets to the theory of philosopher-king in Republic, he calls it the 
biggest wave which must be overpassed: 
 
I have now come to what we likened to the greatest wave (κύματι).1 (473c6-7) 
 
As each problem is like a wave for Plato that he has to overpass, each wave of 
dialogues focuses on resolving a main problem.Plato’s philosophy can best be 
imagined as anocean. That his philosophy is as widespread, vast and deep as an 
ocean, maybe more than any other philosophy during all the history, is something 
that many would agree upon. It is not, nonetheless, the great and glorious character 
of his philosophy which is the intention of this poetical resemblance, but the 
characters of the waves of an ocean. Plato’s dialogues can best be divided to groups 
that behave like waves. Like each group of his dialogues, a wave in theoceanhas a 
pushing force, a rising path, a high point and a fall. Each wave, independently 
identifiable,makes the movement of another wave possibleand so the next wave has 
the power of its previous waves leading it to go forward to do the same for its next 
wave.This interwoven character of dependence-independence of each wave is what I 
                                                 
1This kind of naming is also compatible with Plato’s own way of theorizing as he always 
makes use of entangible things as models trying to explain complicated matters. 
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have in mind about Plato’s dialogues. Each group/wave of dialogues has a pushing 
force, a problem or paradox that is to be resolved in its way by some new theories 
and methods. The wave, thus, rises upward making both the problem and the need of 
its solution as radical as possible until it gets to the highest point by resolving the 
problem and getting to thefavourite results. Nevertheless, no solution is completely 
acceptable in Plato’s philosophy and there are always new problems and issues. 
Therefore, every wave has a fall that can be the starting point of the next wave.The 
suggestion of waves of dialogues saysindeed that Plato’s dialogues cannot be treated 
altogether by taking all the dialogues as a whole nor each of the dialogues singly and 
independent from all the other dialogues. The best is to treat couples of them as a 
chain that though is somehow independent has a special relation with couples of 
other dialogues.I distinguish four waves in Plato’s dialogues as follows. 
i) Socratic Wave including: Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology, Clitophon, Crito, 
Hippias Minor, Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages, Laches, Charmides, 
Euthyphro, Hippias Major and Parmenides I.
1
 
ii) Epistemological Wave including: Protagoras, Gorgias, Euthydemus, Theaetetus, 
Cratylus, Meno andPhaedo. 
iii) Ontological Wave including: ParmenidesII, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos 
(Republic 473-541)  
iv) Political Wave including:Politicus, Ideal State (Republic357-473), 
Laws,Epinomis, Critias. 
Besides some maybe dubious or at least less important dialogues, I dismissed 
Philebus, Phaedrus andSymposiumfrom taking part in this chronology. In spite of 
some obvious resemblances with the dialogues of the ontological wave especially 
Timaeus, both in its ontological approach and even in its stylometric features, 
Philebus cannot be emplaced in the overall project of the waves. The onto-
epistemological chronology, to be honest, is unable to read Philebus in Plato’s 
corpus as I think none of the other chronologies could get at an acceptable 
explanation of its relation with the other dialogues. We have problems also to 
emplaceSymposium andPhaedrus in our plan. They seem to belong, nevertheless, 
more to the period between the epistemological and ontological waves or even 
coexistent with some dialogues of the latter wave.Phaedrusin which we are 
encountered with probably last serious echo of theory of anamnesis,
2
 on the one 
hand, shows its close connection with Meno and Phaedowhileits presenting of the 
method of collection and division, on the other hand, associates it to Sophist and 
                                                 
1
By Parmenides I, I mean the first part of the dialogue which is discussing the problems of 
Socrates’ theory of Forms and lasts till 137. Parmenides II consists the part from 137 to 
the end of the dialogue where Parmenides’ One is being discussed. 
2
The mentions of the theory in Philebus (342b) and Laws (732b) appear to be, as Sayre 
(2005, 193) notes, 'entirely removed' from the sense it had before. I am not convinced 
with Kahn’s (1996, 367) appealing to Politicus 277d and Timaeus 41e-42d as the 
passages in which the theory is alluded or implied. 
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Politicus. Contrary to most of the scholars who date the Phaedrus quite late in 
Plato’s career1 and afterSymposium, Moore (1973) insists on the converse relation of 
the two dialogues taking Phaedrus as earlier.
2
Whatever their relation might be, the 
similarities between the two dialogues besides their incompatibility with the 
epistemological and ontological waves may call for a different wave. 
Except the first wave, of the order of its dialogues we discuss below,the 
dialogues of all the other three waves are arranged chronologically. When a dialogue 
is located after another dialogue and before a third one in the epistemological and 
ontological waves, it means that either its epistemological or ontologicalstatus, is 
between those dialogues. The case is the same about the order of the dialogues 
between different waves,except the last wave in which the order of the dialogues of 
the political wave must be considered parallel to, or interwoven with, the dialogues 
of the ontological wave. 
a) Socratic wave 
The first and longest wave, includes a) a group of ten dialogues (ordered 
alphabetically):Alcibiades I, Alcibiades II, Apology,Clitophon, Crito, Hippias Minor, 
Lysis, Menexenus, Republic I, Theages, b) a second group of four dialogues:Laches, 
Charmides, Euthyphro,HippiasMajor, and c) the first part of Parmenides. I 
distinguish these last five dialogues from all the other ones which are called Socratic
3
 
dialogues ordered alphabetically. Laches, Charmides,EuthyphroandHippias 
Majormust be considered, without chronological order between themselves, after the 
Socratic dialogues and before the first part of Parmenides. It is not difficult to guess 
how surprising it looks for the reader to sea the first part of the Parmenides here in 
the first wave after Socratic dialogues and before all the other ones. This is the most 
revolutionary suggestion of OECD. 
The leading problem of the wave is historical Socrates’ problem of acquiring 
knowledge reshaped by Plato in Socratic dialogues. It is this problem that leads to the 
theory of Forms in the Socratic dialogues and especially inLaches, Charmides, 
Euthyphro,HippiasMajor and Parmenides I. While Hippias Major (301b2-6) 
criticizes the onto-epistemological grounds ofSocratic dialogues, Parmenides 
                                                 
1
Kahn (1996, 373) points to some evidences of Phaedrus’ referring to Republic (cf. 
Hackforth (1952, 3-7). Irwin believes that Phaedrus must be considered as a 'revision' or 
'development' of the views of both Republic and Symposium and not an anticipation of 
them (1995, 12). 
2
 Being certain about Symposium’s posterior date, Moore asserts that while writing 
Symposium, Plato must have 'firmly' had Phaedrus in mind. Mostly based on Phaedrus’ 
more sophisticated logic represented in its method of collection and division, Dillon 
(1973) argues against him. 
3




Icriticizes the theory of Forms as it is formulated in them. I agree that there is not 
enough material in there to be called a 'theory' of Forms to be criticized in 
ParmenidesI, but where else can such a theory be found?
1
The poor discussion of the 
theory in the early dialogues is the main reason that,as far as I know, noone has 
suggested that ParmenidesI is criticizing the theory of Forms of the early dialogues 
by now. As we will discuss below, the theory of Forms in those dialogues isindeed 
constructed in a way to escape those attacks. 
b) Epistmological wave 
This wave includes a) Pratogoras,Gorgias and b)Euthydemus,Theaetetus, 
Cratylus
2
, MenoandPhaedo.While I guess that Gorgias is probably later than 
Protagoras, I cannot be certain about their relation with the other six dialogues that 
are chronologically arranged.
3
 I called this wave epistemological because I believe 
that it includesPlato’s epistemological endeavor to solve the epistemological problem 
arisen in Parmenides I (133b-135a). 
The backbone of this wave, however, is Plato’s epistemological project from 
Theaetetus to Phaedo where 1) by the distinction of knowledge and true opinion, (a) 
the epistemological problems of the early dialogues are resolved and (b) the 
epistemological ground for the theory of Forms is provided (cf. Tim. 51d3-5); 2) by 
the doctrine of anamnesis, the method of hypothesis and the theory of Forms as 
                                                 
1
Cf. Fine, 2003, 29 
2
The relation of Cratylus and Theaetetus is a Problem with which the current chronologies 
do not know what to do (cf. Runciman, 1962, 2). While Cratylus looks close to the early 
dialogues, it has some unignorable similarities to Theaetetus, which is considered far 
from the early and after the middle period dialogues. While OECD resolves this problem 
easily considering Theaetetus as early, about the order between Theaetetus and Cratylus I 
cannot be certain at all since there cannot be found any certain ontological or 
epistemological priority between them. All that can be said is that they are close to each 
other as some of their main themes, especially the problems of flux, Protagoras’ 
relativism and false belief might bring to mind. Never holding a 'confident opinion', 
Runciman, however, dates Cratylus 'somewhere before' Theaetetus (ibid). 
3
Gorgiasmentions the distinction of knowledge and true opinion without discussing it, a 
distinction proved in Theaetetus and used in Meno. While it is accepted that there can be 
false conviction besides true conviction (πίστιςψευδὴςκαὶἀληθής) (454d5), false 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμη…ψευδὴς) (d6-7) is strongly prohibited. Gorgias accepts the first 
simply by saying Ναί and rejects the second strongly by saying Οὐδαμῶς.It shows, 
though not strongly, that they might have been composed after Theaetetusand before 
Meno. While, on the other hand,the problem of teachability of virtue seems to indicate 
that both Gorgias and Protagoras may belong to the period of Meno, there might be some 
indications of their priority. I found Jane M. Day’s (1994 cf. 10) points about the priority 
ofProtagoras tenable though maybe I am not as certain as she appears to be. She dates 
Gorgias later than Protagoras and closer to Meno. 
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causes, the epistemological problem resulted from the separation of the Forms and 
their participant as it had been drawn out at Parmenides 133b-135a, is resolved. The 
epistemological wave includes, thus, some essential modifications in Plato’s theory 
of knowledge to save the theory of Forms as well as to solve some of the 
epistemological problems of the early dialogues. This means that this wave is an 
epistemological project, a doctrine that may not be accepted by some scholars. 
Charles Kahn, for instance, thinks that in what he calls the 'series of dialogues from 
the Meno to the Phaedrus', not only is not any sign of linear development, in which 
different epistemological theories replace each other, but 'different concepts of 
knowledge are used in different contexts for different purposes' (2006, 130). 
Although the epistemological wave does not say that there actually is a unique 
theory, it emphasizes the unity of a project or process. Moreover, some kind of a 
linear development from Theaetetus to Republic through Meno and Phaedo can be 
recognizable, but not a development of replacing different theories but a 
development of theory that gets enriched and more sophisticated. The complicated 
epistemological theory of Republic as is construed in the allegory of line can 
reasonably be taken as the development of the theory of the distinction of knowledge 
and belief in Theaetetusand Meno.  
c) Ontological wave 
The four dialogues of Parmenides II, Sophist, Timaeus, Philosophos
1
construct 
the ontological wave.These four dialogues have in themselves Plato’s brilliant 
endeavor to solve the following problems by presenting a new ontology: 
i) Theontological problems of the early dialogues which was itself the ontological 
aspect of the problem of false belief
2
 needed a change of approach to being. This 
shift was doneby accepting the being of not being based on the creative theory of 
'difference'that is initiated in Parmenides II and attains to its fulfillment in 
Sophistand Timaeusand is used inTimaeusandPhilosophos. 
ii) The problems of participation (131a-e) and Third Man (TM) (132a-b,132d-133a) 
in Parmenides Ithatareresolved by the new theory ofbeing inSophistand the new 
theory of Forms inPhilosophos. 
The ontological wave, therefore, is to make Plato’s main modification in his 
understanding of being that results in the refutation ofParmenides’ principle and 
Plato’s achievement to a new notion of being that cannot be the subject of the 
previous problems, neither the problems ofHippiasMajor(301b2-6) norParmenides I. 
 
 
                                                 
1
As it will be discussed in detail, what I call as an independent dialogue is nothing but 
Republic 473-541 where the philosopher is the subject of discussion.  
2
The epistemological aspect of the problem had been resolved by the distinction of 
knowledge and true belief in the epistemological wave. 
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4. Political wave 
This wave is not chronologically separated from the ontological wave but gets 
along it as a somewhat synchronous wave. Although the dialogues of this wave, 
Politicus, Ideal state
1
 (RepublicII-V), Laws,EpinomisandCritias are arranged 
chronologically after one another, their dates can be neither before nor after the 
ontological wave, save the publication of Laws which is almost certainly the last one 
of all the dialogues and after Plato’s death.Politicuswas certainly written after 
Sophist and probably before Ideal state which itself must have been composed before 
                                                 
1
That the books II-V of the Republic is mostly the same as the famous Ideal State has been 
suggested before. Cf., e.g., Ryle (1966) 
Hippias Major 
Socratic Dialogues: 
Alcibiades I &II, 
Apology, Clitophon, 
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both the Laws and Timaeus.Epinomis, if it has been written by Plato himself that is 
strongly dubious, must be dated after the composition of Laws. The order of the 
dialogues of the two ontological and political waves, considered together, must be 
something like this: Parmenides II, Sophist, Politicus, Ideal state,Laws 
(composition),Epinomis, Timaeus, Critias, Philosophos/Republic,Laws (publication). 
The overall scheme of Plato’s dialogues based on our arrangement of them is drawn 
in scheme 1 above. 
The development of Plato’s philosophy based on our onto-epistemological 
investigation will be something like scheme 2 below. Plato who had started the 
Socratic wave with Socrates’ search of knowledge as the motivating force of the 
wave provides a theory of Forms thatis referred to in dialogues like Laches, 
Euthyphro,
1
Charmides and Hippias Major. This theory is the very theory which 
Allen (1970) calls the 'earlier theory of Forms'; a theory that cannot be identified 
with the theory of Forms presented in the dialogues of the so-called middle period. 
The onto-epistemologicalgrounds of these dialogues turn out as problematic in 
Hippias Major (301b2-6), as the theory of Form turns out to be problematic in the 
first part of Parmenides. Here is the first and biggest turning point of Plato’s 
philosophy where based on those critiques, he tries to reconstruct his philosophy by 
changing the epistemological and ontological principles of his philosophy.  
The first effort is an effort in the theory of knowledge. In spite of the problems 
related to the false belief in EuthydemusandTheaetetus, knowledge turns out to be 
distinctfrom opinion in Theaetetus. This is, I think, the main goal of Theaetetus.
2
 
This distinction provides the epistemological grounds for the theory of anamnesis 
and the method of hypothesis in Meno andPhaedo, theories that are to resolvethe 
epistemological problem ofParmenides. Since besides the ontological aspect of the 
problem of false belief, the problems of participation and TM are still annoying not 
received their answers in the epistemological wave, the ontological wave tries to 
resolve them. 
These problems made Plato launch another wave, this time trying to change the 
theory of being. The starting point of the wave is the second part of theParmenides 
where the Parmenidean notions of being and unity are to be attacked. This attack has 
at least three important results: i) separating oneness from being in Parmenides’ 'One 
Being', ii) accepting that ParmenideanOne and Being are problematic and finally iii) 
introducing the notion of 'difference'. Plato makes use of these results in Sophist, 
TimaeusandPhilosophos.The points (i) and (ii) lead in Sophist to the rejection of 
                                                 
1
Prior (1985, 9) insists that the theory of Forms is 'as explicitly present' in Euthyphro as it is 
in Phaedo and Republic. 
2Cornford’s suggestion that the aim of the dialogue is to examine and reject the experimental 
approach to knowledge is not compatible with the place he and others dedicate to 
Theaetetus. It is not a suitable time, to reject the experimental approach after Meno, 
Phaedo and Republic since they are already out of the approach and need no rejection. 
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Parmenidean absolute being and provides a new relation between being and 
difference which makes resolving the problem of false belief possible.The new 
relation of being and difference helps to resolve the problems of participation and 
TM. Therefore, at the end of the ontological wave, the onto-epistemological 
problems of the early dialogues and the problems of the theory of Forms in 
Parmenides are all resolved. The development of Plato’s thought based on our thesis 
is shown in Scheme 2 below. 
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Now it is time to defend the place of the dialogues that made the main changes 
in the current chronologies and turned it to OECD, namely Parmenides I, 




The place of Parmenides in the current chronologies is the cause of many 
problems. Not only the problems of Parmenides I, on the one hand,cannot be 
correctly appliable to the middle dialogues, butthere are problems either to observe 
its problems as invalid or valid. The main problem out of the place of Parmenides in 
the current chronologies, generally speaking, is that theycannot provide a consistent 
story of Plato’s development in which Parmenides can have its deserving role. By 
the new place of this dialogue in OECD, we are not only to make the story 
consistent, but to dedicate the most prominent role to the dialogue. All Plato does in 
the so-called middle and late dialogues is going to be interpreted in OECD as Plato’s 
two efforts in the theories of knowledge and being to resolve the problems of 
Parmenides I. 
To set Parmenides I at the end of the early dialogues and before all the other 
dialogues is the most astonishing and, at the same time, the most vital decision of 
OECD. In fact, what changes the current chronologies to OECD is a new story of the 
development of Plato’s thought based on the problems of the theory of Forms in 
Parmenides I.The new place of Parmenides in OECD can, I think, be explainedwell 
regarding what happens in the dialogues both before and after it. In relation to the 
other dialogues of the Socratic wave its place is so dramatic. Having challenged the 
Athenian interlocutors, Socrates(the wisest man of Athen),and his theory of Forms 
(the very instrument by which he used to refuse his interlocutors because they were 
not able to explain what a thing itself, i.e. the Form, is) are now the subject of the 
attacks of Parmenides, a non-Athenian, in almost the same way of  the 
dialogue.Respecting the dialogues after it, what is done in Plato’s other dialogues 
from Theaetetus to Phaedo in the epistemological and from Parmenides II to 
Philosophosin the ontological waves is nothing but Plato’s effort to reconstruct his 
theory of Forms with his new doctrines and methods in epistemology and ontology. 
The best reason for accepting OECD’splace forParmenides Iis what happened in the 
dialogues of both the epistemological and the ontological waves. 
i) There appears to be a problem about OECD’s place for Parmenides: where is that 
theory of Forms that is to be observed as the subject of Parmenides’ problems? Since 
it is as long as a history that we are accustomed to recognize Plato’s theory of Forms 
with what is suggested in Phaedo and Republic, it might then be wondrous to hear 
that Parmenides is criticizing the theory as it is in Euthyphro, Laches and Hippias 
                                                 
1
That the first part of Parmenides has the appearance of a work complete in itself,  is 
something can hardly be deniedeven by those scholars, like Meinwald, who do not 
believe it as distinct from the second part and written at a different time (1991, 5-6). 
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Major alongside some other Socratic dialogues and not as is proposed in Phaedo and 
Republic. First, if we mean by a theory a doctrine fully and completely 'constructed',  
I agree that there cannot be found such a theory in the early dialogues as it cannot be 
found anywhere else in the other dialogues as well. It is somewhat related to Plato’s 
way of introducing his theories but is more, I think, related to the theory of Forms 
itself. Comparing with the theory of Forms, the doctrine of anamnesis, for example, 
as it is introduced and articulated in Meno and Phaedo or, even more obviously, the 
method of hypothesis in Phaedo and Republic are far better theorized and 
constructed. It shows that Plato was able to construct a theory of Forms in some of 
his dialogues instead of reminding the theory dispersedly here and there. It indicates, 
I think, that he was hesitant to theorize it from the beginning. It is not, therefore, 
reasonable to expect him to provide such a theory at the outset and in his early 
dialogues when he is wavering about it even at his much later dialogues.  
Second, besides Plato’s oral tradition, there actually exists a theory of Forms in 
the early writings- the dialogues that have been considered by OECD as earlier than 
Parmenides- if we do not expect a fully constructed theory. This theory which is 
called by Allen (1970) as the 'earlier theory of Forms', differs in some essential 
features from the theory of Forms as construed in some of the dialogues of the 
epistemological and ontological waves (the so-called middle period dialogues). 
While the 'earlier' theory has some features that make it vulnerable to the attacks of 
Parmenides, the theory of the so-called middle period dialogues tries to resolve them. 
The way in which the theory tries to resolve the problems is discussed in the next 
section below. Nonetheless, the main point is that the universal and unequipped 
Forms of the early dialogues turn to the Forms which became much more equipped 
(by new theories)  and even considered as paradigms (especially in Republic). 
 Thirdly, the naive and elementary way of discussing and defending the theory 
by young Socrates who is ready more to suggest different views than defending one 
firm and fixed theory, approves that there is no such theory yet. Thus, I take 
Socrates’epiphet, "young", in Parmenides as functional because Parmenides refers to 
it as a cause of the naivety of the theory (e.g., 130e, 135c-d).
1
   The critics of Hippias 
Major (301bf.), thirdly, can indicate how Plato did criticize his own theories in the 
Socratic wave. In spite of the fact that we cannot find anywhere in the dialogues 
before Hippias Major where Socrates be saying that he is cutting up things in words 
and so on, this attitude of Socrates is criticized in there. This shows that Parmenides’ 
critiques can be read in the same way and there may be no necessity of finding more 
than what we have about the theory of Forms in the written works of the Socratic 
wave. 
                                                 
1
In his second letter (314c3-4), Plato asserts that his written works are not the works of Plato 
but of a Socrates 'made fair and young (καλοῦκαὶ νέουγεγονότος)'. This 
younghoodmust of course be considered as compared to the reral Socrates who was adult 




I am not personally satisfied with OECD’s place forEuthydemus. It must 
probably placed after ParmenidesI, maybe before Theaetetus or during the time 
between Theaetetus and Meno.From an epistemological point of view, its discussion 
of false belief belongs to the period that is engaged with the problem of false belief, 
that is, in OECD, between Theaetetus and Sophist. The problem of learning either 
what one knows or what one does not know (276d) resembles Meno’s 
paradox.Euthydemus, however,seems to be,epistemologically, close to Theaetetusand 
before it but ontologically prior to Sophist. The problems of the possibility of telling 
lies (283e), impossibility of false speaking (86c-d) and the paradox of knowing or 
not knowing (293c-d) all belong, epistemologically, to the period of the 
Theaetetusand Meno. Moreover, the definition of knowing as having knowledge 
(ἔχεινἐπιστήμην) at 277b9-c1 can be considered as related with the same theory at 
Theaetetus 197b1 and prior to the distinction of having and possessing knowledge 
that follows it.  Nonetheless, Euthydemus has neither any clear discussion of the 
distinction of knowledge and belief nor of the theory of Forms. All these can allow 
us to consider it epistemologically close to Theaetetus and prior to it
1
. Futhermore, 
this place does not affect the currentattitudes insofar as they consider it either as an 
early or transitional dialogue that is prior to Meno. The difference is then about its 
place regarding Parmenides I and Theaetetus. 
4. Theaetetus and Sophist 
Both the current chronologies and OECD agree upon positing Theaetetus after 
Parmenides, but they differina) the place of Parmenides and b) Theaetetus’distance 
fromSophist. By bringing Parmenides to an earlier period while keeping 
Sophistcloser to the place it had before, the OECD’splan make a long distance 
between Theaetetus and Sophist consideringat least MenoandPhaedoin between. 
Here are our proofs for this arrangement: 
i) We believe thatMeno’s discussion of the distinction of knowledge and opinion 
(97a-b, 97d-98b) must be posterior to Theaetetus’ distinction (187bff., 201dff.) 
simply because while it is demonstrated in the latter, it is only used in the 
former.Phaedo highly resemblesMeno and, as it isgenerally agreed, belongs to the 
same period. 
ii) MenoandPhaedointend to resolve a) the problem of false beliefas it was drawn out 
in Euthydemus and Theaetetus and b) the epistemological problem of ParmenidesI, 
both epistemologically. The interrelated doctrines of the distinction between 
knowledge and opinion, anamnesis and the method of hypothesis try to solve those 
problems by a new theory of knowledge. Sophist, on the contrary, intends to deal 
with the problems ontologically. While the theory of anamnesis explains how we can 
                                                 
1
In spite of all these points,Euthydemus’way of talking about dialecticians at 290c sounds 
surprisingly like Republic.  
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have such a thing as true belief distinct from knowledge, which itself is kind of 
resolving the problem of false belief, it cannot explain how false belief can 
ontologically be possible because it needs that the being of not being be accepted 
first, a thesis that is not accepted before Sophist.We also noted thatbesides the second 
part of Parmenides, Sophistcannot be later than Republic because it is in Sophistthat 
the being of not being is accepted before to be used in Republic. Now, a careful 
consideration of this fact besides the above discussion of the epistemological mission 
of Theaetetus, Meno and Phaedo to resolve the problems of (a) and (b) 
epistemologically, lead us to the important result that these last three dialogues,being 
unable to resolve the problems ontologically, tried to present epistemological 
solutions.This means that they were prior to the Sophist-Republic solutions because 
the ontological solution does not require the epistemological solution. OECD seems 
to be, therefore, right to make the epistemological wave prior to the ontological 
one.An evidence of this is the absence of the theory of anamnesis in Republic. Why 
it never appears in there?Mentioning the myth of Er at 619bff.and the later 
incarnation at 498d as evidence, Kahn (2006, 130) thinks that 'something like' 
anamnesis is actually presupposed in Republic. Nonetheless, he agrees that it does 
not appear in an epistemological context. Our question, nonetheless, is exactly about 
the absence of the epistemological role of the theory in Republic.Kahn (ibid) thinks 
that the omission of the theory in Republic is not because Plato changed his mind 
about knowledge. He notes that at 518c Plato is clearly a kind of innatist. Having the 
allegory of Cave in mind, his suggestion is that it has some rhetorical and artistic 
instead of conceptual and philosophical reasons. He thinks that the theory does not fit 
with exactly the same part of the Republic we departed as Philosophos, i.e., from the 
end of the book V to the end of the book VII.I hope my discussion about Plato’s 
development can show why the theory is not needed anymore in Republic. This is an 
onto-epistemological and thus, contrary to Kahn, a philosophical reason. The 
omission of the theory in Republic is simply because by the new metaphysics 
suggested in the mentioned books of Republic, there is no need to the theory of 
anamnesis anymore. The classification of being and knowledge as it is drawn in the 
allegory of Line and the dialectical search of knowledge from the lower classes to the 
upper ones which is itself based on Republic’s specific theory of hypothesis can 
provide the knowledge of Forms without having them before, i.e. without anamnesis. 
iii) What is the reason for consideringSophist immediately after Theaetetus? What is 
the reason for considering Theaetetus with Sophist, Politicus and Parmenides as 
Eleatic dialogues as, for instance, Dorter (1994) does except that their characters are 
from Elea? It is obvious that Theaetetus’ reference at 183eand Sophist’s at 217c to 
Parmenides do not prove anything more than that they are post-Parmenides 
dialogues. Even Sophist’s reference at 216a to Theaetetus cannot mean more than 
that it is a later dialogue. The distance between these two dialogues can easily be 
shown by the obvious stylometric differences of Theaetetus on the one hand, and 
Sophist and Politicus on the other hand. While Sophist obviously belongs to the late 
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period dialogues, Theaetetus, as Tarrant notes, 'approximates less to the style of the 
late dialogues as measured by stylometry than do the later books of the Republic' 
(2000, 37).All the time references of the dialogues that yesterday we had such a 
discussion (Sophist 216a) or tomorrow will continue the other one (Theaetetus 210d) 
are, I think, only dramatic considerations and cannot be taken as exact chronological 
time distances.
1
What these references can at most signify is that one dialogue has the 
other dialogue in mind either dramatically or philosophically by intending to 
continue the issue or resolvethe problems that had been drawn in those dialogues, as 
Sophist continues the issues of both Theaetetusand Parmenides II.To say that some 
times after writing Theaetetus, Plato decided to write another dialogue with some of 
the same characters especially Theaetetus and as its sequel, probably because he 
wanted to pursue the same problem,
2
namely the problem of false belief, but this 
timewith a new ontological attitude, is quite more acceptable than Ryle’s suggestion 
(1966, 284) that Plato kept Sophist and Politicus in his shelf, a suggestion that was 
mostly based on the stylometric evidence. The generally agreed supposition that 
Theaetetus and Sophist are sequel or, as Ryle says,'a sort of sequel'
3
 (1939, 316) has 
even more problems. Theaetetus, firstly, is clearly a more close to the Socratic 
dialogues and is far less complicated than Sophist. Secondly, the method of 
collection and division to which Sophist is so bounded is almost absent in 
Theaetetus. The trilogy of dialogues promised at Sophist 217a3, thirdly, discussing 
sophist, stateman and philosopher starts with Sophistand not Theaetetus.
4
The 
                                                 
1
The allusions to the historical events that occur occasionally in some dialogues can be 
interpreted merely as dramatic or, as Mackey says, 'later interpolations' using past events 
(1928, 11). As Maccabe (2008, 96) points out, even the dialogues making vigorous 
claims to historicity 'bear the marks of fiction'. The writer of the dialogues, like a play 
writer, designs the scene, chooses the most suitable location and time and to make it 
appear more real, uses some real events of that time and location. It cannot be denied that 
the dramatic features of the dialogues are not negligible for Plato. We will not thus rely 
on the allusions to the historical events. 
2
 Thinking that the reappearance of Theaetetus in Sophist is a 'clear reminder of continuity' of 
the same project (2013, 94), Kahn accepts that 'a considerable lapse of time' might have 
occurred between their composition. 
3
He thinks that the two dialogues were composed after the Parmenides 'as a whole' (1939, 
316-317). 
4
 Gill’s suggestion (2012, 1) of a tetralogy opening with Theaetetus is not tenable. Besides 
the cross references of which we discussed above, I cannot understand how she can take 
the similarity of characters as an evidence whereas the difference of Theaetetus with 
those two in this respect is obvious enough. The change of Socrates as the main speaker 
in Theaetetus to a visitor from Elea as the leading character in the other two dialogues 
does not let us agree with her. Suppose we accept that the change of Socrates with a 
visitor from Elea in Sophist might be related to the duty of the dialogue in criticizing 
Parmenides: to guarantee, as Kahn (2013, 94) suggest, 'an atmosphere of intellectual 
sympathy'. What then about Politicus?Gill thinks, however, that 'Plato substantially 
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ontological status of Sophist, fourthly and most importantly, is incomparable with 
that of Theaetetus that means they must belong to different periods. 
iv) Unlike Sophist and Republic that are inclined to distinguish between the objects 
of knowledge and belief, Theaetetus’ epistemological theories like the theories of 
Meno and Phaedo do not make distinction between the objects. In the analogy of 
block of wax, the difference of two men, one judging truly while the other falsely, 
are explained in their waxes (194c-e). Whereas the wax of the soul of one man is 
deep, abundant and smooth and hence the signs that are imprinted on are lasting, it is 
vice versa in another one: hard, shaggy, rugged and without depth which in not well 
imprintable and hence does not have distinct impressions making it liable to false 
judgment. The problem of false belief is to be treated here in this analogy by a 
subjective analysis trying to make the difference in the knower and not in the object 
of knowing. The analogy of Aviary is also the same in this respect: possessing 
(κεκτῆθαι) and having (ἔχειν) are distinct but not by their objects. It is the same 
object, a coat, that you have when you are wearing it, but you possess when though 
you have bought it, you are not wearing it now (197b8-10). A man who has birds in 
his aviary possesses them but he does not have them in his control and his hand 
unless he will (c1-5). So is the knowledge (197e). 
The birds are the same whether you have or possess them. What is different is 
the knower’s situation and not the known. It is exactly this kind of difference in the 
side of the knower that is to be taken as the explanation of the distinction of 
knowledge and true belief in Meno. True opinions are resembled to the statues of 
Daedalus that run away and escape if not tied down: true opinions become 
knowledge (ἐπιστήμαιγίγονται) after being tied down (98a5-6) because 
knowledge differs from true opinion in being tied down 
(διαφέρειδεσμῷἐπιστήμηὀρθῆςδόξης) (a7-8) which is itself done by 
theαἰτίαςλογισμῷ (a3-4). The fact that there is obviously no distinction between 
the objects of knowledge and true opinion in Theaetetus and Meno keeps them far 
from Sophist and Republic where the being of not being makes a third status, ἔοικος, 
which is taken as the object of opinion and distinct from the object of knowledge.  
The case of Cratylus is much the same as Theaetetus. The explanation 
presented there about the word doxa based on toxon meaning shooting a bow (420b), 
has a sign of its closeness to Theaetetus. Moreover, false speaking is still impossible 
(429c, 430c). So it can be said that while Theaetetus, Cratylus and Meno have 
distinguished between knowledge and true belief, they have not yet reached to its 
ontological correspondent.  
                                                                                                                                          
revised an earlier version of the Theaetetus to fit into a series with the Sophist and 
Statesman' (p.3, n. 8). 
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5. Parmenides II 
The second part of Parmenides that Palmer rightly calls 'the most puzzling and 
controversial text in the Platonic corpus' (1999, 148) is the only part in a dialogue 
that is totally different from its complementary part. Nowhere else can we make such 
an apparent distinction between parts of a dialogue. From Parmenides 137ff. we 
have a long chain of arguments hypothesizing various propositions 
regardingParmenides’"One" and again hypothesizing their opposites making an 
inescapablelabyrinth. Its obvious differencefrom the first part of the dialogue makes 
the idea of Parmenides as an assembled dialogue more probable; an idea thathas 
been suggested by some commentators.
1
 
i) The second part of the Parmenides is the initiating point of a new effort to save the 
theory of Forms. What Plato had tried to do in the epistemological wave was to 
provide solutions for the epistemological problem of Parmenides, but the problem of 
participation and TMare still fatal at the end of the epistemological wave. He had to 
start thus from the same point, i.e., Parmenides. This was not, nevertheless, his only 
reason to choose Parmenides as Socrates’ interlocutor to attach this new writing to 
the previously written dialogue with him but there was a more principal reason. He 
needed to go beyond Parmenides’ notion of One Being and this, I believe, was his 
main reason. What were to be reassessed was (1) Parmenides’principle of the tight 
attachment of "one" and "being"as the cause of his famous principle that 'being is 
one' and (2) Parmenideanunderstanding of "being" which was the cause of his 
principle of the impossibility of being of not being. In agreement with many 
commentators, I thinkParmenidesII is the first step of Plato’s going beyond these two 
notions, and this can be observed as a major purpose of the dialogue. It is in this 
passage that Plato criticizes the relation of being and the same (162d) which can be 
considered both as the basis and thenecessary result of Parmenides’ principle, 'Being 
is one'. Thiscriticism that makes use of the notion of difference (143b) is only the 
preparatory step of his use of this notion in Sophist (255d ff.) by which the 
Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being is rejected. If we 
read Parmenides II and Sophistas the sequel steps of an ontological project, we can 
see how the project of rejecting Parmenidean notions of One and Being leads to the 
notion of difference which itself is the basis of Plato’snew ontology in Sophist and 
Republic. This ontology has the solution of Parmenides I’s problems of participation 
and TMand, at the same time, the problem of false belief. The second part of 
theParmenidesmust then be dated after the epistemological wave and as the starting 
point of the ontological wave.Why can't we, one might ask, observe this ontological 
wave parallel to, or interwoven with, the epistemological wave? My main reason for 
the chronological order of two waves is that the dialogues of the epistemological 
                                                 
1
 Ryle, for example, thinks that these two parts were composed at 'considerably' different 
dates (1966, 216). Also cf. Thesleff (1989, 19) and Tarrant (2000, 140-141) 
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wave, or at least Menoand Phaedo,are still unaware of the ontological wave’s 
solution.  
ii) The place of ParmenidesII in OECD differs in two main regards from its place in 
the current chronologies: Theaetetus and Republic; while the contemporary 
chronologiesare accustomed to consider Parmenides, and consequently its second 
part, before Theaetetus and after Republic, we are suggesting its contrary in OECD. 
The change OECD implements regarding the place of these three dialogues is mostly 
because Parmenides IImust ontologically be considered between Theaetetus and 
Republic. Theaetetus’ all epistemological efforts to answer the question 'what is 
knowledge?' (145a) with theories like knowledge is perception (151e ff.) or true 
judgment (187b) or true judgment plus an account (201d) besides the analogies of 
block of wax (191c-e), the Aviary (197bff.) and the analogy of knowledge to birdand 
the explanation of getting knowledge as hunting,all still are Plato’s epistemological 
efforts and do not think about the ontological solution.Regarding ontological issues, 
they are still faithful to Parmenidesand are not to challenge his principles as 
Parmenides II does.
1
It is directly asserted at 180e-181a that Socrates got stuck 
between Parmenidean and Heraclitean theories and wants to put a fight and escape. 
This effort, however,does not bring it to the point of Parmenides II.At 
Theaetetus167a7-8we are being said that 'it is impossible to opine what is not 
(οὔτεγὰρτὰμὴὄνταδυνατὸνδοξάσαι)' and at 189a10: 'opining not being is 
opining nothing (μὴὄνδοξάζωνοὐδὲνδοξάζει)'. 
In ParmenidesII, we have not still gone out of Parmenides’dominance but the 
first step is taken. At 160e, we are encountered with the necessity of dealing with not 
being with some adjectives like "this" or "that" and so on. Though still unable to be, 
not being must necessarily partake of many things: 
 
The One indeed cannot be, if it is not, but it is necessary that nothing prevents it 
from partaking of many things.  (160e7-161a1) 
 
The whole of the sophisticated arguments of Parmenides II can show how 
much the Parmenides’ understanding of being is problematic. What is said, for 
instance, at 162a can be a good example: If the one -which is not- is to be not being, 
it must have being a not-being as a bond in regard to its not-being, just as what is 
must have not-being what is not, if it is to be completely. Although the Parmenidean 
being is not overpassed in Parmenides II, these discussion shows that it is not 
accepted as before. Theaetetus’ attention to the problem of Parmenidean being is 
confined to its contradiction with Heraclitean notion of flux. This understanding, I 
believe, is much more elementary than Parmenides II’s attention to the problems 
                                                 
1
There is an explicit shift from epistemology to ontology at 188c-d saying that perhaps the 
problem of false belief is better to be dealt with the notions of being and not being rather 
than knowing and not knowing which immediately leads to the problem of the 
impossibility of thinking about not being (188d ff.). 
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arisen from Parmenides’ understanding of the concept of being. If our arguments are 
sound, Parmenides II cannot be prior to Theaetetus because of its ontological status. 
This status, on the contrary, makes it prior to Sophist and Republic. The incomplete 
achievement to the being of not being in Parmenides II must antecedate its full 
achievement in Sophist and its implementation in Repubic. 
iii) Being dominant in Sophist and Politicus and absent from Theatetus, the method 
of collection and division has a predominant role in the second part of Parmenides
1
 
while cannot be seen in the first part of this dialogue. This is fully consistent with 
OECD’s arrangement. While the first part of Parmenides and the Theaetetus are 
dated as prior to the dialogues of the epistemological wave, all unaware of the 
method of collection and division, the second part of Parmenides, the Sophist and 
Politicusare engaged with this new method. 
iv) Almost all the stylometric evidences are pro the antecedent date of Parmenides 
regarding Republic. 'In sofar as stylometry suggests anything', Tarrant says,'it 
strongly suggests that both works [i.e. Theaetetus and Parmenides] were begun far 
earlier than the Republic was finished' (2000, 141). 
6. Republic and Laws 
The place of the Republicis the most confusing in the arrangement of the 
dialogues
2
.We have the following evidences: 
a) Based on ontological features, it must be dated after SophistandParmenidesII. 
b) Because of its ontological solution of the problems of participation and TM, it 
must be dated after Parmenides I.
3
 
c) Based on Aristotle’s testimony (Politics, II, 6), it is prior to Laws. 
d) Lawsis unaware of philosopher-king theory of Repulic which implies that its place 
after the final version of Republic might be problematic.
4
 
e) Stylometric evidences strongly suggest that Sophist, Politicus, Timaieus, Critias 
and Philebus belong to the same period of Laws. 
While the ontological evidences, (a) and (b), ask us to consider Republic after 
Sophist and Parmenides, the politicalevidences, (c)
1
and (d), alongside the stylometric 
                                                 
1
Cf. Turnball, 1998, especially pages 41 and 173.  
2
Nails (1998, 174) notes: 'We have perhaps less hope of accurately dating the Republic than 
of any other dialogue in the corpus'. Cherniss’ phrases like 'orthodox opinion' (1998, 293) 
about the place of Republic is interesting. 
3
I am not convinced with Thesleff’s note that the opening of the Parmenides suggests that 
the Republic was finished at the time. He accepts, however, that the book X and 'some 
passages' in the earlier books might have been added later (1989, 19). 
4
Moreover, as Lane (2006, 185) mentions, the book IX of the Laws implicitly suggests that 
the city drawn out in this dialogue is a second-best city as comparing not to the city of 
Republic but to that of the Politicus. 
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evidences (e), tells that it must be prior to the so called late dialogues.The only 
solution is what has been suggested by somescholars that Republic is not a simple 
dialogue but a later composition of some dialogues. Except RepublicIitsseparation 
and being early is a more accepted fact, the passage 473-571is alsoa later attachment. 
Our reasons for its attachment are as follows. 
i) After first book’saporetic ending like a Socratic dialogue, being unable to find 
what justice is, the second book starts by Socrates’statement that:'when I said this 
[referring to his last sentences in the first book, namely that he could not find what 
justice is and soon], I thought I had done with the discussion, but it turned out to 
have been only a prelude' (357a). The discussion continues with the goodness or 
badness of injustice pursuing the first book’s discussion. The search of finding 
individual justice transfers to a search for justice in a city by Socrates’ suggestion 
that they might be more successful to find it if they search it in a larger thing, a city 
(368d), which leads them to construct a city in order to find justice there. This is the 
directing line of the argument whichtends to be exclusively treating with many 
political issues about all the details of constructing a city. After more than 65 
Stephanus pages, we are given the result of this investigation of justice in the city, 
the larger object of investigation,in the middle of the fourth book (433). The 
discussants then try to find the justice in the individual by applying the result they 
got fromtheir investigation of justice in the city (434e ff.). This leads to the tripartite 
structure ofthe soul based on the structure of the city and finally to the result that the 
justice in an individual is just the same as it was in a city, that is, when each of its 
parts does its own work (441d ff.). They then look for injustice (444a ff.) and try to 
answer if justice is profitable or not (444e ff.) which leads itself to the comparison 
between types of souls and types of political constitutions (448c ff.).This topic is, 
however, postponed because of Polemarchus’demand for the explanation of what 
was said before, namely the question that how possessions can be held in common, 
which is at the very beginning of the fifth Book (449a). This topic, then, runs the 
discussion and brings some marginal discussions by 471d where the question of 
possibility of such an ideal city arises.In his first answer to the problem, Plato points 
to the fact that what he had drawn out was only a theoretical model that does not 
need to be proved as a possible city (472).I think this can be the end of the story of 
the Ideal State that had been started from the beginning of the second Book. 
What is said from 473c on is completely a new project and, I think,is attached 
to the Ideal State (357-472). The cities we have, Socrates says, is able to make the 
ideal state possible if the 'greatest wave' can be passed. This greatest wave is nothing 
but the theory of philosopher-king. Socrates is afraid of being ridiculed and laughed 
because of the theory (473c7-9) which shows both its importance and 
                                                                                                                                          
1
 That Aristotle’s evidence is in a political text discussing political issues might allow us to 




Socrates’understandable hesitation about it. Socrates’ own statement can approve 
this: 
 
Until philosophers rule as kings or those who are now called kings and leading 
men genuinely and adequately philosophize …Glaucon!cities will have no rest 
from evils nor, I think, will the human race. And, until this happens, the 
constitution we have been describing in theory will never be born to the fullest 
extent possible or see the light of the sun. It is because I saw how very 





 Although this long time hesitation may hint that what we are being said is 
something that had been doubted to be written or published, we are not going to rely 
only on this. What happens after this and its overall difference from Ideal State can 
be more decisive. The theory of philosopher-king brings forth the question that: who 
are the true philosophers? (475e3) This question turns the discussion to a discussion 
of the philosopher from 473c on. Besides the fact that all of these pages are 
discussing onto-epistemological issues thatare related to the subject of philosopher, 
"philosopher" is itself the subject of the discussions. The question of "who are the 
philosophers?" leads to the passage (476e-479e)  that distinguishes knowledge as 
what is set over being from opinion as what is set over what both is and is not. As the 
lovers of the objects of knowledge, i.e., what is,philosophers are distinct from the 
lovers of sights and soundswho love the objects of opinion (479e-484a). 
Philosophers are those who are able to grasp what the lovers of sights and sounds are 
not able, namely, what is always the same (484b). It is the nature (φύσιν) of 
philosopher which is the subject of inquiry (485a5, at 485a10: 
φιλοσόφωνφύσεων) and is described at 492a1-5 and is again connected with 
things themselves at 493ef.. Socrates then says that the philosophic nature is altered 
in the constitutions of his time and thus links the discussion of philosopher to that of 
the Ideal State (497b ff.) and concludes that philosophers are the best guardians of 
the city (503b) andthey must exercise in many subjects (503e) most importantly the 
Form of the Good (504e-505a). This leads to the allegories of Sun, Line and Cave in 
the sixth and seventh books. After a full discussion of the way guardians must be 
brought about with different sciences in their carears to become philosophers, those 
who survived all the tests and saw the Form of the Good can order the city and 
become the philosopher-kings (540a f.). It is the end of the search for philolopherand 
the way the philosopher must be brought about in the city and also the end of the 
seventh book (541b). Therefore, it can be said that the passage from the last pages of 
book V to the end of book VII, i. e., 473c-541b, has the philosopher as its subject. 
In addition to the unity of this passage of which we tried to provide a very short 
and thus insufficient review, what makes its attachment to theIdeal Statemore 
                                                 
1
 See also: 499a 
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probable is that this discussion of philosopher is in the middle of the discussion of 
common possession in the city; a discussion that had been started from the beginning 
of fifth book (449) and continued till 471d where the problem of the possibility of the 
ideal state directs the discussion to the topic of the philosopher at473c. By the end of 
the discussion about philosopher, we immediately fall into the same discussion at the 
very beginning of book VIII, even without any introduction or a linking paragraph: 
 
Well, then, Glaucon, we've agreed to the following: If a city is to achieve the 
height of good government, wives must be in common, children and all their 
education must be in common… (453a1f.) 
 
After his long diversion from the previous topic, Socrates needs the beginning 
topic to be recalled and Glaucon, reminding the topic, says: 'you were talking as you 
had completed the description of the city' (543c7-8). If I am right in my 
consideration of the part we distinguished as an attachment, having in mind its topic, 
philosopher, and its place in OECD, after Sophist and Politicus, the first probability 
will be that this later attachment is so similar in its topic as well as its order, to the 
unwritten third part of the trilogy of sophist, statesman and philosopher that though 
had been promised at Sophist217a3, has never been published.This motivated me to 
suggest that this passage that I cut up from the Republic might be thePhilosophos, the 
third part of the trilogy.Plato never published the third part maybe because he was 
afraid, as he himself says, of its theme, namely that philosophers must be the kings, 
besides the fact that hegot stuck in another project and thus tried to reshape what he 
had in mind, or maybe even had somehow written, as the third part of the trilogy and 
emplace it in the larger plan of Republic.In her book, Philosophos: Plato’s Missing 
Dialogue (2012), Gill believes that based on the fact that it is not included in the 
ancient survived list of Plato’s dialogues, 'we can be fairly sure that the dialogue was 
not written and lost' (p.1). She thinks that Plato left it on purpose and 'deliberately 
withholds' it to stimulate his audience to combine the pieces about the subject in the 
other dialogues. Focusing on Parmenides, Theaetetus and Sophist, she does not let, 
of course,Republic to take part in this combining because, based on SCD Republic 
must be prior toall of them. 
OECD’s arrangement of the ontological and political waves can explain why 
Plato who was thinking of that trilogy fell into the political wave.Suppose that at the 
time of composing Sophist, Plato was thinking that after writing about it, he will 
write a dialogue about statesman and then another one about philosopher as the 
culmination of the trilogy. It is not strange to imagine that this path was deviated to a 
political inquiry when he became engaged with political issues in Politicus. Instead 
of continuing it with a dialogue about philosopher, he became thus busy with Ideal 
State and Laws. Maybe it was only after Timaeus and with the use of all the 
hierarchical models he had discovered from Ideal State onward that he decided to 
assemble what he had in mind, or maybe in his shelf (!),about philosopherwith his 
search for the Ideal State and based on the question of 'what is justice?' in Republic 
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I,which had been composed long time ago.
1
 If I am right in this suggestion, both the 
posterior date of the Philosophosand its difference from Ideal State can be more 
acceptable.  
ii) The epistemological difference between the Philosophos and Ideal State also 
worths remarking. What is said in the third book at 402b, that to know the copy, 
knowledge of original is necessary, seems prior to and even inconsistent, though not 
necessarily, with what is said in the sixth book and in the theory of hypothesis by 
which one goes upside from copy to original without having the knowledge of the 
original. The difference of 473-571 from the other passages of Republicand specially 
Ideal Stateis also clear from its mostly metaphysicalcontent that is definitely 
separable from its previous passage dealing exclusively with political issues. This 
content is the very one which we considered as the evidence of Republic’s being later 
than Parmenides II, Sophist andTimaeus. Therefore, if we accept that Republic II-X 
has at least two assembled parts, we will become able to manage the confusion arisen 
from the arrangement of Republic and Laws. It is the political part of Republic,Ideal 
state, which is prior to Lawsand is referred there and, probably, was in Aristotle’s 
mind
2
 when said that Lawsis after Republic.The later date of the Philosophos, the 
very passage the idea of philosopher-king is drawn out there can also suggest a 
solution to the problem ofLaw’s negligence of the philosopher-king doctrine that had 
surprised commentators.  
iii) 'Before stylometry', as Prior asserts, 'almost all scholars would have placed the 
Republic after the Sophist' (1985, 168). This was due to the stylometric evidences 
that Republicis dated now in SCD as middle and prior to many dialogues. 
Nonetheless, the assembled character of Republic suggests a sound solution for the 
biggest problematic decision of OECD regarding stylometric evidences.   Suppose 
that Plato who had composed the first book of Republic much earlier and most 
probably in his early period of writing and the Ideal State in another time, now 
decides to compose the Republic which includes not only those dialogues but what 
was in his mind or even written, the Philosophos, as the third part of the trilogy. It is 
not then of a shock to say that since he wanted to rewritethem as the continuation of 
Republic I, he tried to keep a unified style as for as possible.Lutoslavski also 
approves a later date for the books VI and VII of Republic.
3
 
                                                 
1
Aristotle’ statement in Politics II 1264b39 that Socrates filled upthe Republic with 
'extraneous discourses' can be noteworthy. Reminding that the 'three résumés of the 
original Ideal State' shows that it contained nothing about justice, theological fables or the 
dispensability of Homer, dialectic and so on, Ryle adds that our version of the Republic 
was not assembled until Plato returned from Sicily (1966, 244-245). 
2
That Aristotel tells this in a political passage (Politics II, 6) makes this more probable. 
However, the reason can simply be the date of Law’s publication which is surely later 
than Republic. 
3
There are some other reasons that might be taken as evidence for the lateness of the 




By the suggestion of the distinction of the Philosophos from the Ideal State, the 
date OECD considered for Timaeus becomes more acceptable. The passage in 
Timaeus(17a, 18b) which has always been taken as referring to Republic,is 
indeedreferring to Ideal State. This helps us consider it as a prior dialogue to 
Republic because it seems thatits ontological statusindicates its place between 
Sophistand Philosophos.
1Owen’s main reasons for dating Timaeus after Republic and 
before Politicus(1998, 260-261) are these: 
a) The opening of the dialogue (17a) refers to a dialogue that had occurred the 
previous day that most probably is Republic.  
b) At Timaeus 18b the idea that guardians must have no gold or silver or any private 
property refers to Republic417a and 547b-548b.  
c) The Politicus (at 292a, c and 293a, c-d) insists four times (?) that whether the ruler 
has any wealth is completely irrelevant to the quality of his governance. Owen thinks 
that this is said as a novel doctrine.  
d) The system of marriage of the guardians in Republic (457c-465c) echoed in 
Timaeus (18c-d) is abandoned in Politicus (310c-311c). 
These evidences can lead to another arrangement between the dialogues if we 
accept Republic II-Xas having two parts, the Ideal State and the Philosophos: (a) and 
(b) are clearly referring to the Ideal State and not to the Philosophos.Moreover, not 
only (c) and (d) are not problematic regarding OECD’s arrangement but they can 
even be supportive because the more elementary status of Politicus’political 
discussion
2
 regarding Ideal State is thoroughly consistent with OECD’s later date for 
Ideal State and Republic. Unlike Owen, I think what is said about the rulers’ 
wealth(293c8-d2)can be more of an evidenceapproving the priority of 
Politicus’theory than presenting a new theory against the past theory.Unlike Owen 
who thinks that this is a novel doctrine, I think it might equally mean that Plato is not 
yet achieved to his more complicated theory of propertyless rulers. Moreover, that 
Plato does not speak in Politicus of the marriage of the guardians can similarlybeout 
of the fact thatPoliticus is still unaware of the idea. Owen, however, agrees that 
neither Timaeus nor Critias seem to know anything about Republic’s doctrine that 'a 
state may be saved by the supremacy not of immutable laws but of an 
ἀνήρφρόνιμος above the law' (1998, 264).Owen and Nicholas P. White (1976, 91) 
                                                                                                                                          
closest passage among Plato’s dialogues to his famous lecture 'On the Good' and also 
Philebus. 
1
Ryle notes that the discussion of pleasure at Republic 583b 'presupposes' and advances 'a 
long way beyond' Timaeus (1966, 249). 
2
Lane (2006, 180) speaks of two points in Politicus that went unnoticed in Republic; (1) the 
knowledge of the Good 'in time' (2) which must be made authoritative over the 




are right that Timaeus is closer to Republic than the late dialogues
1
 but Cherniss is 





































                                                 
1
Rickless also prefers to agree with Owen mostly because of the theory of Forms in Timaeus 
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